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Abstract
This paper examines the impact of inequality on poor people in Latin America. It is argued that development
policies in Latin America and other developing regions should focus not only on eliminating poverty and
deprivation but also on preventing and reducing inequality. By inequality we refer not only to differences in
income or consumption between population groups but also to divergences in the access to social and
political rights (education, health care, voting, and so on). Although conceptually related, poverty and
inequality are two distinct phenomena and it is possible that falls in poverty may be accompanied by
increases in inequality and vice-versa. In fact, many Latin America countries have experienced the former in
recent years. In the long-term, however, persistent inequalities as those observed in the Latin America
region will undermine efforts to reduce poverty and destitution due to the emergence of poverty traps caused
by the impossibility of economic and social mobility of certain population groups. This will have important
consequences for the challenge of achieving the Millennium Development Goal of halving poverty
worldwide by 2015. In addition, persistently high inequalities will also impact negatively on crucial
economic, social and political variables and will thus seriously undermine the success of any development
strategies.
JEL codes:
Keywords: Inequality, poverty, developing countries, Latin America.
April 20031. INTRODUCTION
This paper argues that development policies in Latin America - and in other developing
regions - should focus not only on eliminating poverty and deprivation but also on
preventing and reducing economic, social and political inequalities. The high levels of
inequality typically observed in the Latin America region pose a serious threat to recent
development undertakings, not only because inequalities may seriously undermine efforts
to eliminate poverty and destitution, but also because persistent inequalities waste
financial and human resources, erode social cohesion and, consequently, pose serious
constraints to the process of social and economic development.
Economists and policy makers have, for a long time, accepted that economic growth will
typically be accompanied by a certain level of inequality. As such, inequality has been
viewed as a side-effect of the development process, and not necessarily a negative one. As
a consequence, inequality is seldom perceived as a problem on its own and is usually
analysed in conjunction with concerns over poverty and general welfare. However,
persistently high levels of inequality have a negative effect on the prospects for economic
growth and are associated with forms of social and economic exclusion. Large evidence
has shown that countries with high levels of inequality achieve significantly lower
economic growth (see for instance Datt and Ravallion, 1992 and  Kanbur and  Lustig,
1999). In the specific case of Latin America, Hanmer et al. (1999) have shown that if the
levels of inequality do not decrease, the region will have to pursue much higher economic
growth rates in order to halve poverty by 2015. In addition, high levels of inequality will
imperil social cohesion as they may lead to increases in crime and other forms of social
and political conflict. These, in turn, create insecurity and distrust amongst economic
agents, which poses a further risk to economic growth and social development.
Not all the types of inequality are adverse as there is some scope for personal choice in the
processes that lead to inequalities. We need thus to distinguish between  functional
inequalities - inequalities that are likely to arise in a market economy as a result of
rewards to risk-taking, enterprise, skill acquisition and saving and  dysfunctional
inequalities - inequalities that arise from lack of opportunities, social and political
exclusion of certain population groups and other forms of discrimination, from a colonial2
legacy or from political connections and inherited wealth. All the issues discussed in this
paper refer to dysfunctional types of inequality. In fact, a large body of evidence has
shown that inequality in Latin America is largely dysfunctional and originates from the
lack of opportunities for large segments of the population and the “outright (or implicit)
exclusion of some groups on the basis of their gender, ethnic origin, place of residence or
social status” (Behrman, Gaviria and Székely, 2002: abstract).
By inequality we refer not only to differences in income or consumption expenditure
between population groups that hinder the welfare of these groups, but also to
discrepancies in social and political indicators. The persistence of inequalities due to
social exclusion and difficulties in accessing social services and socio-political institutions
has undermined efforts to decrease income inequality, has increased group and individual
vulnerability and has created poverty traps caused by the impossibility of social and
physical mobility. Persistent inequality will hence impact negatively on the prospects for
increasing economic growth and reducing poverty because improving the monetary
position of certain poor groups may be ineffective if these groups are being prevented
from accessing key economic, social and even political rights. In Latin America these
groups are typically African descendants and/or indigenous populations, who are often
found more likely to be poor, have lower education, lower nutrition levels and worse
access to health care and other social institutions than any other population groups (Justino
and Litchfield, 2002). Just as income is only one aspect of poverty, income inequality is
only one aspect of inequality and other aspects (in particular, social, cultural and political)
may have had an important role in the processes and inputs that have led to the well-
documented persistence of large inequalities amongst groups and individuals in Latin
America.
The multidimensional aspects of inequality will be examined in more detail in section 2,
while section 3 we analyse the extent of inequality in Latin America across various
dimensions (rural/urban, regional and across different population groups) and various
types - economic (income, employment and land), social (health, education and social
security) and political (access to power and legal institutions). Sections 4 and 5 discuss,
respectively, the impact of inequality in development and what can be done by
governments, the civil society and the international community to reduce inequalities in
Latin America and elsewhere.3
2. INEQUALITY: CONCEPTS AND DIMENSIONS
Although it is commonly accepted that poverty and inequality are related phenomena, the
two concepts are not equivalent. The crucial difference between the concepts of poverty
and inequality lies in their main focus: when examining poverty, whether we are
concerned with material deprivation or less tangible, psychological dimensions of poverty,
we focus on people, families and/or households that lie below some poverty line. When
talking about inequality we no longer focus solely on poor people, but on the whole
distribution.
1 When this difference between poverty and inequality is taken into account it
becomes clear that changes in inequality do not necessarily have to be associated with
changes in poverty. Furthermore, it is possible to conceive of situations where poverty
(measured by the percentage of individuals and/or household below a poverty line) can
fall yet inequality increase. For instance, in circumstances where the whole population is
equally poor, if one person moves above the poverty line, poverty estimates will decrease
whilst inequality would have increased. Furthermore, as empirical evidence discussed
throughout this paper will demonstrate, although a high level of inequality is usually
associated with high levels of poverty (e.g. Nicaragua, Honduras), relatively low levels of
inequality
2 can easily coexist with both low (e.g. Uruguay, Argentina) and high degrees of
poverty (Peru).
3
Just as the poverty measurement literature is rife with debates over issues such as
definitions, poverty lines, equivalence scales and the measures used to aggregate the
information on those identified as poor into a summary statistic, the inequality
measurement literature has a long and equally impressive pedigree. Although important
studies of poverty and inequality were published much earlier (see for instance Rowntree,
1901), the subject really took off during the 1970s, after the publication of A. B
Atkinson’s article ‘On Economic Inequality’ in 1970 and the first edition of A. K. Sen’s
                                                
1 In the poverty measurement literature this is reflected in the focus axiom that requires poverty measures to
be invariant to changes in the poverty indicator (e.g. income) above the poverty line (Sen, 1973).
2 Inequality levels in Latin America lie very much at the top end of the scale of observed inequality levels
across all developing countries, hence it is  not  possible to observe low levels of inequality except in
comparison to the Latin American average.
3 See Kanbur (1987) and Fields (1980). Fields shows evidence on other countries where trends in poverty
and inequality have moved in opposite directions. See also World Bank (1990).4
‘On the Measurement of Inequality’ in 1973.
4 Since then inequality measurement has been
studied using an axiomatic approach of a prescribed set of desirable properties of
inequality measures. Most measures of inequality are now assessed with a reference to
those first axioms and others that have been suggested as the literature on the subject
developed. The technical appendix of the paper includes a discussion of the most
important axioms currently used in the measurement of inequality.
5 Formulae for the
commonest measures of inequality are also contained in the technical appendix.
The literature on inequality measurement, as illustrated by the technical appendix to this
paper, refers often solely to income inequality. However, as discussed in Justino and
Acharya (2003), income inequality may not be sufficient for characterising adequately the
level of social welfare in a given society. This is because the Gini coefficient and other
conventional measures of income inequality reduce the multidimensional phenomenon of
inequality to a one-dimensional phenomenon (Tilly, 1998; Justino, 2001; Cramer, 2001),
which naturally misses important socio-political aspects and effects of inequality (social
position, access to political power and other institutions, access to education and health
care, etc). These measures are, furthermore, vertical measures of income distribution and
will not hence take into account horizontal inequalities between regional, ethnic, class or
religious groups (Stewart, 2000) (see Justino and Acharya, 2003).  Decompositions of
income inequality into vertical (within-group) and horizontal (between-group) inequalities
have suggested that between-group inequality is often the most important aspect of
inequality in several developing countries (e.g. Anand, 1983 for the case of Malaysia;
Bates, 1981 and Easterly and Levine, 1997 for the case of Ethiopia; Litchfield, 2001 for
the case of Brazil; Kanbur, 1998 and Stewart, 2000 for review). Although decomposition
methods provide a way of measuring horizontal inequality, they are applied to
distributions of monetary variables and, hence, still portray inequality as a one-
dimensional phenomenon. Income inequality is, thus, only one dimension of inequality
and it is possible that by focusing exclusively at income inequality we are ignoring a
                                                
4 See also, for instance, Anand (1983), Cowell (1995) and Sen (1997). Note, however, that some measures of
poverty can inform us on the extent of inequality in society. This is the case with the poverty gap and the
squared poverty gap indices, which measure, respectively, the depth and severity of poverty by attributing
larger weights to the bottom of the income distribution (see the statistical appendix at the end of the paper).
5 See Cowell (1985) on the axiomatic approach. Alternative axioms to those listed in the technical appendix
to this paper are possible and the appropriateness of these axioms has been questioned. See Amiel (1998),
Amiel and Cowell (1998), Harrison and Seidl (1994a, 1994b) amongst others for questionnaire experimental5
whole set of important constraints to economic and social policies, notably in terms of
policy targeting and the choice of appropriate policy interventions to alleviate inequality
and poverty (Justino, 2003).
Although this more extensive view of inequality implies an increase in the difficulties
involved in the measurement of inequality due to the subjectivity of the concepts involved,
we must not overlook the fact that inequality is a multidimensional phenomenon. Despite
the fact that most studies of inequality tend to concentrate on the analysis of income
inequality, inequalities arise due to other economic, social and political factors. Some of
the most important include (see Justino and Acharya, 2003):
¤  disparities in employment conditions (between, for instance, skilled and non-skilled
workers),
¤  differences in the access to land and other physical assets,
¤  discrepancies in the use of and access to health, education and other social services,
and
¤  variations in the rights of access to political power (reflected, for instance, in the
membership of labour unions and the exercise of voting rights) and access to legal
institutions.
In this sense, the concept of inequality can be associated with the concept of social
exclusion. The concept of social exclusion was originally developed as a form of
categorising conceptually population groups that were left at the margin of social
insurance systems in Europe: the mentally and physically handicapped, single parents, etc
(Behrman, Gaviria and Székely, 2002). Throughout the 1980s, the concept  started to be
adopted by most social sciences and its original meaning extended to form a framework
for thinking about deprivation and poverty in terms of material and non-material
disadvantages – such as poor educational opportunities, low wages, employment
insecurity and so forth – and the nature of social justice (as emphasised by the question
‘equality  amonsgt whom?’), social participation, lack of social integration and lack of
power (Behrman, Gaviria and Székely, 2002). This interpretation of the concept of social
exclusion is closely related to the notion of inequality, when considering inequality in its
                                                                                                                                                  
tests of the desirability of these axioms, and Cowell (1999), for an introduction to alternative approaches to
inequality.6
many dimensions (economic, social, political and cultural). However, similarly to
inequality and poverty, inequality and exclusion are not equivalent notions. Whilst
inequality refers to differences in income, assets and access to social and political
institutions between various population groups, it does not necessarily imply that those
groups will be excluded from accessing those economic, social and political institutions.
Being excluded will, however, imply the existence of inequalities, when exclusion is not
voluntary. As argued by Sen (1985), there is a need to consider and distinguish between (i)
the realisation of one’s objectives irrespective of one’s own role and (ii) their realisation as
a result of one’s efforts. Social exclusion can, in the context of (i), be understood as a
manifestation of extreme forms of inequality. Involuntary forms of exclusion – which
result from the absence of opportunities for large segments of society (Behrman, Gaviria
and Székely, 2002) - can, thus, be understood as a consequence of extreme forms of
inequality across the economic, social and political elements listed above.
The various types of inequality are of course not homogeneous across society and are
likely to differ between rural and urban areas, between regions and between different
population groups. The diagram below (discussed in Justino and Acharya, 2003)
summarises the different aspects of inequality and will constitute the basic framework for





























Groups (gender, ethnicity and race)
Source: Justino (2003).7
 3. CHARACTERISATION OF INEQUALITY IN LATIN AMERICA
This section analyses in detail the extent of inequality in Latin America across all types
and dimensions illustrated in the diagram above. We tried to discuss the extent of
inequality in Latin America first, across three types (economic, social and political) and,
second, across three dimensions (regional, rural/urban and population groups). However,
because the aspects of inequality discussed above do not take place independently of each
other (see Justino and Acharya, 2003) and, in many circumstances, they overlap, it was
difficult to compartmentalise the various types and dimensions of inequality in neat
sections. However, as discussed in Justino and Acharya (2003), although the overlap of
the various types and dimensions of inequality may difficult the empirical analysis of
inequality in Latin America, it emphasises the complexity of the phenomenon.
The analysis encountered other difficulties. The most important was the lack of adequate
disaggregated data. Household surveys are one of the richest sources of information on the
different forms of inequality. Unfortunately, representative household surveys are not
available for all countries. And when they are available they tend to cover recent years and
thus do not allow the construction of an historical picture of inequality in Latin America.
They also tend not to cover remote rural areas, a particularly serious problem as these are
areas inhabited by groups likely to be found at the bottom of any economic, social or
political distribution of assets and rights. For example, the Brazilian household surveys
exclude the rural population of the North of the country (the states of Rondônia, Acre,
Amazonas, Roraima, Pará and Amapá) which is where one would expect to find some of
the Amazonian indigenous peoples (Justino and Litchfield, 2002).
Despite these difficulties, information available in various studies of Latin America has
allowed us to build a strong picture of the extent of the various types and dimensions of
inequality in Latin America and fill in an important gap in the literature on inequality in
Latin America, which, more often than not, focus solely on income inequality. Because
the literature on income inequality in Latin America is quite significant, we start our
analysis by re-examining the extent of income inequality in Latin American countries
before proceeding to the analysis of social and political inequalities.8
3.1. Income inequality in Latin America
Table 1 and the data presented in the statistical appendix to this paper illustrate the extent
of inequality and poverty in several Latin America countries.
TABLE 1 - INCOME INEQUALITIES IN LATIN AMERICA
AND THE REST OF THE WORLD
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
OECD countries 0.40 0.37 0.38 0.37 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.37
Latin America and the Caribbean 0.52 0.50 0.54 0.54 0.52 0.55 0.55 0.56
North Africa and the Middle East 0.50 0.47 0.50 0.49 0.41 0.47 0.39 0.35
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.52 0.51 0.56 0.44 0.42 0.46 0.53 0.45
South Asia 0.39 0.37 0.37 0.38 0.38 0.39 0.36 0.30
East Asia and the Pacific 0.40 0.38 0.36 0.40 0.39 0.40 0.40 0.38
Formerly Centrally Planned
Economies
- 0.31 0.28 0.27 0.32 0.31 0.33 0.42
Source: Checchi (2000), pp. 13, based on inequality data published by Deininger and Squire (1996) and the
World Income Inequality Dataset published by WIDER and available at http://www.wider.unu.edu/wiid/
wiid.htm
Notes: Income inequality is measured in the table by the Gini coefficient. The Gini coefficient is an index of
income inequality that varies between zero and one. A coefficient close to one indicates that very few people
own most of the income (i.e high income inequality). A coefficient equal to zero indicates perfect income
equality.
Latin America countries have some of the highest levels of income inequality in the world
with an average Gini coefficient above 0.50 since the 1960s (table 1). Moreover, while in
all regions in the world, inequality decrease between 1960 and 1995, it increased in Latin
America.
6
One striking observation yield by the data presented in table 1 below and in the table in
the statistical appendix is the fact that, although there were significant reductions in
poverty in Latin America during the 1990s, inequality (measured by the Gini coefficient)
hardly changed during the same period in the countries represented in the table and, in all
countries (with the exception of Costa Rica and Honduras), it increased between the early
1980s and the late 1990s.
7 This is reflected in the poverty gap and squared poverty gap
indices that, in some cases, have increased over the two decades despite significant
decreases in the headcount index. The lowest levels of income inequality in Latin America
                                                
6 And in formally centrally planned economies.
7 This supports the argument discussed in section 2 that though related, inequality and poverty are different
concepts.9
were found in Costa Rica and Uruguay, while Bolivia and Brazil registered Gini
coefficient close to 0.60, some of the highest values of income inequality in the world.
These levels of inequality have had severe negative impacts on poverty in the region.
While poverty decreased in the 1970s in Latin America, it nearly doubled during the “lost
decade” of the 1980s. During the 1990s, although the number of the poor in Latin America
decreased (table in statistical appendix), it still constituted on average around 33% of the
total population and poverty failed to decrease despite higher rates of economic growth,
with the exception of perhaps Colombia (Birdsall and Londoño, 1997).
A large number of studies have reported that poverty in Latin America could be
significantly reduced if income inequalities were not as high as they are. For instance,
IADB (1998) reports that if levels of inequality in Latin America were similar to those in
OECD countries,  poverty in the region would be reduced by two-thirds.  Birdsall and
Londoño (1997) show also that with East Asia’s distribution of assets in 1960, Latin
America would have half the number of poor it has today. The successful achievement of
the Millennium Development Goals of halving poverty by 2015 in a context of equitable
and sustainable development will thus be put at risk if income inequalities continue to rise
in Latin America. This situation becomes even further unsustainable when we examine
other dimensions and types of inequality in Latin America, as failures to reduce poverty in
Latin America have been associated not only with increased inequalities in income, but
also with inequalities in the access to social and political institution, in particular with
inadequate access of some population groups to resources, markets and socio-political
institutions and their exclusion from political power, media access, access to health care,
education and employment and access to markets for land, credit and technology (IFAD,
2001). The section below examines the extent of inequalities across regional, urban/rural
and group dimensions. The next section analyses non-income types of inequality in Latin
America. Section 3.4 summarises the evidence and consolidates the main issues that
characterise inequality in Latin America.
3.2. Dimensions of inequality in Latin America
Income inequality (and other types of inequality) is not homogenous across all segments
of the population. As discussed in Justino and Acharya (2003), disparities between10
regions, between rural and urban areas, between women and men and between minority
ethnic and religious groups and the rest of the population tend to be closely associated
with the extent of inequality in a given society. For instance, in Mexico, World Bank
(1995) reports that the southern states of Chiapas, Guerrero and Oaxaca register poverty
levels that are twice the national average. Furthermore, poverty increased in these states
during the 1990s, whereas it decreased everywhere else.
In terms of rural/urban difference, in Latin America as in most of other developing
countries, urban areas benefit more than rural areas from the provision of public goods and
infrastructure. For instance, in Colombia in 1995, poverty in rural areas was 57.9%, in
contrast with 23.3% in urban areas (World Bank, 1998). This situation is made worse by
imperfections in the access to credit and other financial institutions. Health care, education
and public infrastructure such as communications and housing are also typically worse in
rural areas than in urban areas.  Attanasio and  Székely (1999) find that rural/urban
differences in Latin America account for around 12.2% of poverty in the region, although
this hides extreme variations. This value is, for instance, 30% and 20% in Mexico and
Peru, respectively, and only 4.1% in El Salvador (table 2). In Mexico, the incidence of
income-poverty is almost 50% higher in the rural sector than in the urban sector. Access to
basic services (safe water, health and electricity) is also worse in the Mexican rural sector
(World Bank, 1995). In addition, Ribero and Nuñez (1999) find that in Colombia people
living in rural areas spend less years in school than people in urban areas. Furthermore,
only 32% of rural population in Colombia had access to safe water, compared to 90% of
the urban population (IFAD, 2001).
8
TABLE 2 - POVERTY DUE TO GROUP INEQUALITIES IN LATIN AMERICA














Argentina 10.4 19.9 4.0 0.0 34.4 -
Bolivia   4.8 21.3 0.2 0.1 35.8 13.0
Brazil 10.5 24.8 2.2 0.4 32.4   9.7
Chile 17.9 45.7 1.7 0.2 47.8 13.5
Colombia 12.9 22.9 0.9 0.0 33.3 15.7
Costa Rica 13.5 26.1 3.0 0.4 35.3 13.5
Dominican R.   5.0 14.3 1.4 0.8 16.8   8.4
Ecuador   5.9 10.4 1.2 0.1 17.6   7.8
                                                
8 See table 5 below.11
El Salvador 12.0 16.5 0.1 0.3 26.2   4.1
Honduras 14.7 26.8 3.0 0.0 34.5 17.0
Jamaica - - 7.1 2.9 15.8   7.2
Mexico 25.7 40.3 3.2 1.1 46.9 30.2
Nicaragua -   1.2 0.6 0.1 15.6   3.0
Panama   5.2 14.7 0.7 0.2 21.4   7.9
Paraguay 13.9 18.4 4.0 0.3 26.3 13.0
Peru 13.3 20.6 0.2 0.9 32.4 19.6
Uruguay   6.7 19.6 2.1 0.5 18.8 -
Venezuela   9.1 21.4 0.6 0.3 23.5 -
Latin America
average
11.3 21.5 2.0 0.5 28.6 12.2
Source: Attanasio and Székely (1999), pp. 42.
Note: The results in this table are the outcome of a decomposition of poverty indices, which split poverty
into three components when the population is divided into subgroups according to certain criteria: an
“income” component, a “between-group” inequality element, and a “within-group” inequality term. The
table presents the value of the inequality between-groups statistic. The poverty not accounted for by this
statistic is attributable to within-group differences.
Although gender inequalities tend to be high in developing countries,  Attanasio and
Székely (1999) find, however, that only a very small fraction of total poverty (around
0.5%) in Latin America can be attributed to gender differences (table 2). These results are,
however, based on information provided by household surveys for households headed by a
female. These usually are a very small sample of all households and are often
underrepresented in surveys. Only female-headed households headed by relatively well-
off and well-educated women tend to be adequately represented in those surveys
(Attanasio and Székely, 1999). It is thus possible that gender inequalities in Latin America
are larger than the estimates provided in table 1 lead us to believe. Part of the reason why
gender inequalities seem to be low in Latin America may also be related to the fact that
some of the most important aspects of gender inequality would have been captured by
inequalities across occupations and education levels, as women in Latin America will in
general be employed in lower paid jobs than men and will have lower levels of education.
This issue will be discussed in more detail in section 3.3.2. below.
Race and ethnicity – usually defined as having a maternal language other than Spanish (or
Portuguese in Brazil) - are one of the most important correlates of inequality in Latin
America as African descendants and indigenous peoples often constitute the majority of
the poor in many Latin American countries (table 3).
9 In fact, in Latin America, countries
with large ethnic groups are the most unequal ones (Gacitúa and Sojo, 2000). This also12
coincides with people’s perceptions of inequality in the region. When asked to mention the
most discriminated groups in their countries, the vast majority of the answers concentrated
on three groups: African descendants, Indians and the poor ( Behrman,  Gaviria and
Székely, 2002) (table 4). These perceptions vary from country to country. In Brazil, for
instance, about half of the individuals interviewed mentioned Blacks as the most
discriminated group. In Guatemala, 60% of the interviewees answered that Indians face
the largest discrimination. In El Salvador, 70% of the people considered the poor to suffer
the greatest discrimination (Behrman, Gaviria and Székely, 2002) (table 4).






% non-whites % non-whites
below poverty
line
Bolivia - 88 - -
Brazil 0.1 67 46 54
Colombia - - - 76
Guatemala 45 93 - -
Mexico 15 80 - -
Peru 24  65* - -
Source: Based on information discussed in Justino and Litchfield (2002). The estimates refer to the most
recently available household surveys.
Notes: *This value raises to 86% if we consider only the Aymara speakers.
TABLE 4 – (SELECTED) GROUPS MOST DISCRIMINATED AGAINST IN LATIN AMERICA
African descendants Indians Poor
Panama 32.0 13.3 21.2
Mexico 3.8 46.9 25.5
Bolivia 1.5 46.9 26.5
Guatemala 2.3 58.7 26.9
Peru 22.1 26.6 28.7
Brazil 49.8 0.7 29.5
Ecuador 21.1 31.8 30.6
Uruguay 18.6 0.1 30.9
Costa Rica 4.4 11.0 31.5
Honduras 4.6 6.9 35.3
Chile 1.2 22.2 36.6
Colombia 17.3 11.3 39.8
Argentina 4.9 3.8 40.5
Paraguay 0.4 18.9 44.8
Venezuela 10.9 23.1 45.4
Nicaragua 5.4 3.1 60.3
El Salvador 0.5 0.5 69.1
Source: (Behrman, Gaviria and Székely, 2002).
                                                                                                                                                  
9 This group dimension of inequality is what Tilly (1998) refers to as ‘categorical’ inequality and what
Stewart (1998) calls ‘horizontal’ inequality. These two theoretical frameworks are discussed in Justino and
Acharya (2003).13
This situation is reflected in most social indicators (literacy, school attendance,
malnutrition, infant mortality, access to services etc), which are much worse for
indigenous populations than for society as a whole (World Bank, 1993). H ealth
inequalities are particularly high. In Peru, 27% of all children under age five suffer chronic
malnutrition. The situation in Ecuador is similar. In the Amazon region of Peru this figure
reaches 70%, and in places such as Atalaya with an Ashaninka population, 91% (World
Bank, 1993). Disparities in education between indigenous groups and the rest of the
population are also strong in Latin America. In Mexico, 63% of the indigenous population
(most of them living in the state of Chiapas) is illiterate compared to 42% of the non-
indigenous population. In Colombia, the primary school enrolment rate for indigenous
children is around 11% and 44% of adults in the indigenous population are illiterate. In
terms of access to services, in Mexico, for instance, indigenous people have a poor record
in terms of housing quality and access to services such as piped water, electricity and
communications (World Bank, 1999).
3.3. Types of inequality in Latin America
3.3.1. Other economic inequalities
Although income inequality is by far the largest component of economic inequalities in
Latin America, some evidence has shown that large disparities have also been found in the
employment of skilled and unskilled workers and in the distribution of one important
asset: land.
Employment inequalities
Poor people are often found to be employed in low-earning activities. It is difficult to
measure accurately the extent of employment inequalities in developing economies due to
the presence of large informal sectors and the persistence of underemployment amongst
the poorest households. In addition, it is also difficult to discern the direction of any cause-
effect in the relationship between employment and inequality. However, empirical
evidence collected for Latin America (though not extensive) has shown that employment
inequalities have been closely associated to overall inequality levels.  Attanasio and
Székely (1999) find that 11.3% of total poverty in Latin America is explained by14
differences between sectors of activity using skilled and unskilled labour. They also show
that 21.5% of all poverty in Latin America is associated with differences across
occupational groups. This value hides some regional discrepancies: while in Nicaragua the
extent of poverty explained by inequalities across occupational groups is a mere 1.2%, in
Mexico and Chile that estimate raises to over 40% (table 2).
Land inequality
Land is often one of the most important assets held by the poor and, although other assets
(livestock, capital, etc) may affect their welfare, access to land is usually the asset most
closely associated with the probability of an individual or household being poor in
developing countries (Rodriguez and Smith, 1994; IFAD, 2001). As such, it is not
surprising that differences in the access to land explain to a large extent the persistence of
inequalities in developing countries. This is because people at the bottom of economic,
social and political distributions of assets and rights in developing countries tend to
concentrate in rural areas. Land is important for their economic survival and for their
prospects of social mobility. In most developing countries, land is also a synonymous of
social and political power. Table 5 shows the extent of land inequality in Latin America.
TABLE 5 - LAND GINI CONCENTRATION INDEX IN LATIN AMERICA
Country 1941-1950 1951-1960 1961-1970 1971-1980 1981-1990 1991-2000
Argentina - 0.8625 0.8730 - 0.8598 -
Bolivia - - - - 0.7677 -
Brazil 0.8329 0.8347 0.8370 0.8521 - -
Chile - 0.9330 - - - -
Colombia - 0.8598 - 0.8592 0.7742 -
Costa Rica 0.8072 0.7820 0.7913 0.8133 - -
Cuba - - - 0.6061 0.6339 -
Dominican R. 0.7962 0.7999 0.7900 0.8197 - -
Ecuador - 0.8642 - 0.8155 - -
El Salvador 0.8309 - 0.8386 0.8075 - -
Guatemala 0.8588 0.8280 - 0.8484 - -
Honduras - 0.7512 - 0.7788 - -
Mexico 0.5915 0.6216 0.7470 - - -
Nicaragua - 0.8009 - 0.3177 - -
Panama 0.7129 0.7326 - 0.7778 0.8712 -
Paraguay - 0.8583 - 0.9281 0.9390 0.7843
Peru - 0.9350 0.9355 0.9105 - -
Uruguay - 0.8200 0.8147 0.8034 0.8400 -
Venezuela - 0.9270 0.9244 0.9096 - -
USA 0.7035 0.7152 0.7165 0.7455 0.7536 -
UK 0.7206 0.7166 0.6939 0.6754 0.6214 -15
France 0.5165 0.5772 0.5821 -
Source: IFAD (2001).
Land inequality in Latin America has been very high over the last six decades and has
shown little signs of reduction.
10 This may well explain, to a large extent, the level of
inequality between rural and urban areas in Latin America, as well as regional disparities.
Land inequalities are also often closely related with inequalities in other assets. One of the
impacts of land inequality economists have studied extensively relates to the importance
of land for access to credit and, consequently, how land inequality determines inequalities
in other asset endowments. Attanasio and Székely (1999) report the results of a simulation
that show that in Colombia, if the poor had the same access to credit as the non-poor,
poverty might be reduced considerably. Similar results were found to Costa Rica. The
Costa Rica study shows further that having access to some kinds of capital through credit
markets is as important as owning the asset itself.
The income extracted from land is also important (Escobal, Saavedra and Torero, 1999).
In another study of poverty in Costa Rica, Trejos and Montiel (1999) show that over 90%
of all poor farmers could move out of poverty if they extracted higher productivity from
their land. This suggests that what is important is not only inequality in the access to land
but also disparities in the access to better types of land, new technologies and new
markets.
The importance of land inequality in explaining overall asset and other inequalities is
further emphasised by Birdsall and Londoño (1997). In a study of 43 countries, they find
that income inequality is negatively associated with long-term growth. However, once
they include variables measuring initial asset inequality (initial land distribution and initial
distribution of human capital) into the analysis, the coefficient for income inequality
becomes statistically insignificant. The asset-inequality effect is twice as large when
considering a sample that includes only the poor. In a decomposition exercise they find
further that 0.5 percentage points of the difference in overall annual growth and 1.4
percentage points of the difference in annual income growth of the poor between Latin
America and East Asia is explained by Latin America’s greater initial land and education16
inequality. The importance of land inequalities in Latin America is further explored in the
analysis of inequalities in the case study of Peru in Justino and Acharya (2003). Education
inequalities are explored further in the section below.
The discussion above suggests that there is a large scope for land reform policies to
contribute towards the reduction of inequality in Latin America. Land reforms have,
however, rarely been successful in reducing inequality in developing countries. This
failure is often attributed to the absence of effective mobilisation of the lower classes in
rural areas, the lack of linkages to political parties and to serious redistributive
programmes, and the political and social power of the landowners (Herring, 1983, 1991).
However, a new style of reform has been tried in South Africa, Colombia and Brazil.
These land reform programmes have relied on voluntary land transfers based on
negotiation between buyers and sellers, mediated through local government. The role of
the local government is to establish a legal framework and provide part of the purchase
price to eligible beneficiaries (Deininger, 1999; Killick, 2002). If successful, these land
reforms may increase the accumulation potential of small business and of households with
small home enterprises and, therefore, contribute towards the decrease of asset inequality
in Latin America (Trejos and  Montiel, 1999;  Escobal, Saavedra and Torero, 1999 for
Peru).
3.3.2. Social inequalities
Social inequalities are particularly acute in Latin America and take place in three
important sectors: health care, education and the distribution of social security benefits.
Furthermore, these inequalities are determined not only by the access of some population
groups to health, education and other social services, but also by the quality of these
services.
Most Latin America countries have in place universal primary education and primary
health care, as well as basic social insurance and social assistance programmes. In fact,
social expenditure on health, education and social security in Latin America during the
1990s was quite progressive, in the sense that it reached most of the poor (Stallings and
                                                                                                                                                  
10 Note, however, that we were unable to find updated land Gini coefficients for the 1990s.17
Peres, 2000). However, it is often found that these sectors are organised along a two-tier
system, whereby some population groups have to do with badly organised and poorly
designed public services, whereas better-off groups rely on private insurance, private
hospitals and private schools.
Health inequalities
Table 6 illustrates the access to health and sanitation in several Latin American countries,
disaggregated by rural and urban areas. Table 7 portrays another dimension of health
inequality in Latin America: the degree of infant and under-five mortality by income
quintile.







Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural
Bolivia 74 37 88 43 77 52
Brazil 80 30 80 28 - -
Chile 90 - 99 47 - -
Colombia 97 56 90 32 - -
Costa Rica 95 70 100 99 100 63
Dominican R. 76 83 88 55 84 67
Ecuador 95 49 81 10 70 20
Guatemala 95 74 97 48 47 25
Honduras - 57 91 66 80 56
Nicaragua 34 35 93 28 100 60
Panama - - 99 73 95 64
Paraguay 65 14 70 6 90 38
Peru 89 37 91 31 - -
Trinidad & Tobago 99 98 100 88 100 99
Venezuela 64 30 79 79 - -
Average 81 52 90 49 84 54
Source: IFAD (2001).
TABLE 7 - INFANT AND UNDER-FIVE MORTALITY RATES OF EQUIVALENT CONSUMPTION IN
BRAZIL AND NICARAGUA
Infant mortality Under-five mortality Quintile
Brazil Nicaragua Brazil Nicaragua
1 72.7 98.7 113.3 141.7
2 37.0 77.3 51.7 108.3
3 32.7 64.0 45.0 87.3
4 17.0 60.0 20.3 81.0
5 15.3 40.7 18.7 51.3
Average 43.2 71.9 63.5 99.8
Source: Wagstaff (2000).18
Both tables show that Latin America countries are characterised by large geographical and
class inequalities in terms of health indicators. Table 6 demonstrates the existence of large
disparities in the access to sanitation, safe drinking water and health services between rural
and urban areas. In some countries, like Costa Rica, health inequalities are quite small.
However, for instance, in Paraguay, while 65% of the urban population has access to
adequate sanitation and 70% to safe drinking water, only 14% of the rural population has
adequate sanitation and a mere 6% have access to safe drinking water. Class inequalities
in the access to health are also high. Table 7 shows that both in Brazil and Nicaragua, the
lower income classes face much higher infant and under-five mortality rates.
The design of health systems in Latin America is likely to be an important cause of these
inequalities. In most Latin American countries, health systems are characterised by little
continuity in policy implementation, large number of people unattended for, low health
financing and low social spending. In addition, the allocation of services within public
health systems in Latin America is seldom done according to need and hardly any links
exist between primary care and hospital care. This results in the existence of a large non-
accountable hospital sector, characterised by high costs and little professional regulation
(in terms of working hours, private practice, quality of care, etc) (DFID, 2001). Birdsall
and Hecht (2000) report that in Brazil, in the mid-1980s, almost 80% of all public health
spending was aimed at curative high-cost hospital care, concentrated in urban areas and in
the south (the most affluent area). In Peru, in 1984, Lima benefited from almost 47% of
the government’s budget for patient-related care, even though Lima has only 32% of the
country’s population. This situation changed very little in the past years.
In many Latin America countries, health expenditure is fairly progressive because only the
poor use subsidised government health centres and hospitals. However, the large subsidies
provided by the government to social security-based health care for the middle-classes
counteracts initial  progressivity. In Brazil, for instance, households in the top income
quintile received around 38% of all public subsidies for health (Birdsall and Hecht, 2000).
One of the few exceptions is Costa Rica, where the richer fractions of the population must
contribute towards the social security-based health fund, even if they resort to private
doctors and hospitals. Another exception is Chile, where a single national health fund has
been established, in an effort to promote equity in health. This fund has allowed Chile to
cover another 15% of the population that until recently was not covered by the social19
insurance system (Birdsall and Hecht, 2000). The examples of Costa Rica may, therefore,
provide viable alternatives for the unequal, inefficient and costly health systems currently
in place in most other Latin American countries.
There is a large scope for changes in health policies in Latin America to contribute
towards the decrease of social inequalities in the region. This should certainly be a central
element in government policies in Latin America, as better health access improves
nutrition, decreases mortality rates and increases the human capital availability in the
country. It also increases the chances of individuals accessing better jobs and,
consequently, higher wages. In an analysis of how public and private investments in health
in Colombia relate to future earnings of individuals, Ribero and Nuñez (1999) find that (i)
one more day of disability decreases male rural earnings by 33% and female by 13%, (ii)
having a disability in a given month decreases earnings of urban males by 28% and urban
females by 14% and (iii) having one more centimetre of stature (which is related to the
quality of child nutrition) increases urban female earnings by 6.9% and urban male by 8%.
This strongly suggests that policies oriented toward eliminating health differences would
result in reduced inequalities.
Education inequalities
Deinenger and Squire (1995) report based on a cross-country analysis, that public
schooling benefits the bottom 40 percent of the population the most. This result suggests
that access to education is vital to achieving equality. Tables 8 and 9 illustrate the extent
of inequalities in the access to education in Latin America. Table 8 shows the level of
illiteracy in four Latin America countries, whereas table 9 shows the Gini coefficients for
a distribution of school attainment (defined by years of school completed), compared with
the income Gini coefficients.
TABLE 8 - ILLITERACY RATES IN SELECTED LATIN AMERICA COUNTRIES
Total Male Female Year


























































TABLE 9 - EDUCATION AND INCOME INEQUALITIES IN LATIN AMERICA
AND THE REST OF THE WORLD
Variable 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
OECD countries
Av. years of education 6.75 6.98 7.46 7.65 8.59 8.66 9.00 8.81
Attainment inequality (Gini) 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.23 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.24
Income inequality (Gini) 0.40 0.37 0.38 0.37 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.37
North Africa and the Middle East
Av. years of education 1.03 1.12 1.36 1.57 2.14 2.77 3.48 4.90
Attainment inequality (Gini) 0.86 0.86 0.83 0.83 0.78 0.71 0.65 0.53
Income inequality (Gini) 0.50 0.47 0.50 0.49 0.41 0.47 0.39 0.35
Sub-Saharan Africa
Av. years of education 1.01 1.65 1.61 1.66 1.96 2.14 2.32 2.74
Attainment inequality (Gini) 0.83 0.74 0.75 0.73 0.67 0.64 0.63 0.75
Income inequality (Gini) 0.52 0.51 0.56 0.44 0.42 0.46 0.53 0.45
South Asia
Av. years of education 0.91 1.37 1.74 2.08 2.45 2.81 3.20 4.23
Attainment inequality (Gini) 0.86 0.80 0.78 0.76 0.77 0.73 0.69 0.62
Income inequality (Gini) 0.39 0.37 0.37 0.38 0.38 0.39 0.36 0.30
East Asia and the Pacific
Av. years of education 3.72 3.96 4.34 4.71 5.35 5.82 6.31 6.43
Attainment inequality (Gini) 0.51 0.49 0.41 0.39 0.35 0.32 0.31 0.39
Income inequality (Gini) 0.40 0.38 0.36 0.40 0.39 0.40 0.40 0.38
Latin America and the Caribbean
Av. years of education 3.06 2.99 3.37 3.47 3.97 4.13 4.74 6.17
Attainment inequality (Gini) 0.50 0.51 0.48 0.45 0.44 0.44 0.39 0.43
Income inequality (Gini) 0.52 0.50 0.54 0.54 0.52 0.55 0.55 0.56
Formerly Centrally Planned Economies
Av. years of education 3.92 4.83 5.28 3.61 3.68 4.96 6.09 8.17
Attainment inequality (Gini) 0.33 0.36 0.32 0.56 0.53 0.45 0.35 0.23
Income inequality (Gini) - 0.31 0.28 0.27 0.32 0.31 0.33 0.42
Source: Checchi (2000), pp. 13.
As with health inequalities, table 8 reveals that illiteracy is much higher in rural areas in
Latin America than in urban areas. Illiteracy is also higher for females than for males,
which highlights the fact that gender inequalities in Latin America may indeed be higher
than what is suggested by the results in table 2 (see discussion in section 3.2. above).21
Education inequalities are quite significant in Latin America. Table 9 shows that the extent
of education inequality and income inequality in Latin America were quite similar in the
1960s. However, while income inequality increased between the 1960s and the 1990s,
education inequality decreased in the four decades represented in table 9. However,
despite this decrease and, although education inequality is lower in Latin America than in
other developing regions (North Africa and the Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa and
Asia), it is almost twice the level of education inequality in OECD countries and in
formally centrally planned economies. Furthermore, the Gini coefficients for education in
Latin America hide discrepancies across the region. Attanasio and Székely (1999) find
that quite a large percentage of poverty in Latin America is associated with inequality in
education. They show that in Latin America, on average, 28.6% of the total poverty would
be eliminated if there were no disparities between education groups, whereas in Mexico,
Honduras, Costa Rica, Chile, Bolivia, and Argentina, more than one-third of the overall
poverty rate is accounted for by educational differences (table 2). Thus, “having more or
less skills is a stronger determinant of poverty than being located in rural areas, being
employed in relatively unproductive sectors of activity, belonging to female-headed
households, or living in households with relatively young or old heads” (pp. 19). Attanasio
and Székely examine also the distribution of average years of schooling of all adults
between 25 and 65 years of age across three different income quintiles. They find that the
average difference between the poorest and richest 20% is 6.1 years of school. This
average hides very different realities: while in Venezuela the difference is of around 4
years, in Brazil, Colombia, El Salvador, Panama, Mexico and Bolivia the difference is of
more than 7 years. They find further than inequality in education reflects itself in
inequalities in labour participation and earnings (groups with higher education levels tend
to have higher rates of participation in the labour market and higher earnings), particularly
for females.
11
Apart from a few exceptions (Brazil, Honduras and Guatemala), universal primary
education is in place in Latin America. The central problem currently faced by Latin
American countries is thus the improvement of the quality of education and the
implementation of universal secondary education (Londoño, 1996; IADB, 1999). This is
because one of the factors behind inequality in education in Latin America is the fact that
                                                
11 Trejos and Montiel (1999) obtain similar results for Costa Rica.22
while the rich carry on until they finish university, the poor typically leave school at the
end of primary education. This fact is illustrated in table 10, which depicts returns to
education in Latin America in the mid- to late-1990s. The table shows clearly that the
higher the level of education, the higher the returns to education in all countries
represented in the table. This naturally creates inequalities in all areas affected by
education returns (earnings, job achievements) between those with higher levels of
education and those with only primary school education.
TABLE 10 - RETURNS TO EDUCATION IN LATIN AMERICA DURING THE 1990S











Argentina 1996 0.12 0.21 0.34 0.60 1.03
Bolivia 1995 0.06 0.16 0.25 0.56 1.13
Brazil 1996 0.41 0.76 1.13 1.65 2.39
Chile 1996 0.19 0.38 0.67 1.08 1.92
Colombia 1997 0.19 0.55 0.82 1.28 2.10
Costa Rica 1995 0.21 0.37 0.57 0.84 1.44
Dominican R. 1996 0.30 0.49 0.63 0.75 1.39
Ecuador 1995 0.23 0.49 0.90 1.26 1.64
Honduras 1998 0.17 0.40 0.59 1.79 1.92
Mexico 1996 0.09 0.40 0.93 1.65 2.43
Nicaragua 1993 0.40 0.55 0.71 0.99 1.47
Panama 1997 -0.03 -0.06 0.00 0.23 0.96
Paraguay 1995 0.32 0.71 1.07 1.63 2.26
Peru 1997 0.22 0.29 0.50 0.56 1.09
El Salvador 1995 0.26 0.49 0.73 1.17 1.77
Uruguay 1995 0.18 0.36 0.73 0.93 1.46
Venezuela 1997 0.27 0.43 0.58 0.88 1.59
Average LA 0.18 0.37 0.61 0.95 1.52
Source: Attanasio and Székely (1999), pp. 43.
The most important issue in Latin America is thus not to increase the access to education
overall, but to ensure that more of the poor complete secondary school. This implies also
improving the quality of primary schools attended by the poor (Londoño, 1996). Attanasio
and  Székely (1999) report that in Chile children from poorer families tend to attend
schools with the lowest scores in terms of student achievement, whereas children from
richer families attend the best scoring schools. Inequalities in both the quantity and quality
of social services is bound to reflect themselves on wage inequalities and labour market
segmentation (IADB, 1999), as better schooling is also associated with greater social23
mobility (Lam and  Schoeni, 1993;  Behrman,  Birdsall and  Székely, 1998;  Dahan and
Gaviria, 1999; Binder and Woodruff, 1999).
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Inequality in access to social security
The extent of social inequality in Latin America is concentrated not only in the health and
education sectors but also in the access to the social security benefits. Most countries in
Latin America have implemented social security systems. However, coverage by those
systems varies substantially across the different countries and population groups. Most
systems have, in fact, resulted in the “stratification of social security” (Mesa-Lago, 1983),
whereby the most powerful groups (militarymen, civil servants and the labour aristocracy)
benefit from the best systems. This resulted in very regressive systems with the higher
strata benefiting from better systems than the lower income groups (mostly uninsured).
The more powerful the pressure group, the earlier it receives social protection, the greater
the degree of coverage, the less costs it has to cover and the more generous the benefits it
receives (Mesa-Lago, 1983). For instance, in 1973 in Brazil, people with less than one unit
of minimum legal salary contributed with 17.2% of their income towards the social
security system, whereas the contribution of those with more than nine units of minimum
legal salary was of 11.5%. Governments have slowly tried to change this situation. The
pioneer was Chile who, in 1981, implemented a privately managed and funded defined-
contribution system, controlled by the government. The Chilean model was recently
adopted by Peru, Argentina, Colombia, Uruguay and Mexico. Evidence has shown,
however, that in practice the systems have not met their redistributive objectives of
transferring income from the rich to the poor and disparities in the coverage of rural and
urban workers remain (CIID, 1999). There is also evidence for a negative impact of the
new systems on new gender inequality: at the time of retirement, women get lower
pensions than men (due to their longer life expectancy), despite receiving lower salaries
and spending less time in the labour market (due to their reproductive role) (CIID, 1999).
These system represent nevertheless a positive departure from the regressive pay-as-you-
go systems that were previously in place.
                                                
12 See also Justino and Acharya (2003).24
3.3.3. Political inequalities
Inequalities in access to political power
High levels of inequality may create barriers that prevent the poor from equal political
participation as the rich and, consequently, from voicing their demands in equal weight to
the rich.
13 Gacitúa and Sojo (2000) argue that, in Latin America, democracy failures (in
particular, clientism and corruption) have resulted in the exclusion of large sectors of the
poor population from involvement in political life. They have also resulted in the “over”-
representation of the non-poor and in the favouring of alliances between the non-poor and
the poor on terms that are disempowering to the latter. Thus, the non-poor accumulate
political advantages both through their domination of the state apparatus, the legal system,
and the parties and through their informal social power, as landowners, bankers,
employers, media voices, academics, and the controllers of pervasive patron-client
relations.  Of course the situation varies from country to country, and from one historical
setting to the next, but the politically powerful remain heavily concentrate among a narrow
and unrepresentative stratum of society - white, male, university educated (often abroad),
urban, propertied, with privileged access to the legal system and embedded within highly
personalised support networks. In addition to these objective characteristics, the
traditionally powerful non-poor are subjectively unified by a variety of (partly unspoken
and unanalysed) beliefs about the status quo, their place within it, and the debts they owe
to each other. All this makes for a durable and flexible system of elite domination and
perpetuation, and it structures and limits the political spaces available to the majority of
poorer and less privileged citizens.
It is true that within the elite, all sorts of discordant points of view may be expressed, and
this stereotypical image of a closed dominant oligarchy self-consciously dedicated to the
protection of its own privileges may not be present in all Latin American countries. The
general point is that, despite an appearance of pluralism and even ideological discord, the
dominant political groupings operate within a tacit and socially understood framework of
assumptions about their privileges, entitlements and impunities. When these assumptions
come under threat (e.g. from democratization or from political movements demanding25
redistribution) ranks are closed and underlying realities become more visible. This is
illustrated by the recent events in Venezuela, where the process of liberalisation entered in
serious conflict with the historical dominance of collusive elites and a highly skewed
distribution of resources and rights. This seriously dysfunctional democratic system has
resulted has resulted in acute economic and social setbacks.
The influence of elites simultaneously accentuates and is accentuated by the low
organisational capacity of poorer groups. Empirical evidence in support of this argument
is unfortunately scarce. Escobal, Saavedra and Torero (1999) estimate that membership of
social organisations is closely associated with poverty in Peru. In Colombia, there was an
effort after 1982 to restore democracy in local governments and reallocate  sectoral
functions to municipalities (Moore and Putzel, 1999). Some evidence has suggested that
democratic decentralisation has increased the representation of non-elites in the country,
although other problems have limited the reduction of inequalities in the country.
We need to ask thus how the poor majority can make their voices heard, and perhaps
redress these structural political inequalities given the formal and informal advantages
concentrated in the hands of elite groupings. One possibility is to seek a powerful
oligarchic patron who is willing to build a multi-class clientele system.  The PFL in Brazil
(based in Bahia and led by Antonia Carlos Magalhaes) is a spectacular demonstration of
how this may be successfully accomplished.  In this case those poor citizens who are
willing to throw their weight behind a traditional oligarchic establishment, and not
question or meddle with its prerogatives, may obtain both material and possible even
political advantages derived from its electoral success. But within this framework there
will be strong disincentives to autonomy organisation or consciousness raised by the poor
(against the rich). The model is at best one of conditional empowerment through vertical
channels. An alternative possibility is to organise strategic segments of the poor majority
in autonomous structures directed against the prevailing patterns of privilege and
inequality. The PT in Brazil has followed that route (notably in greater Sao Paulo under
Lula) with success comparable to that of the PFL in a different region of the country.
Here the model is one of radical mobilization on a horizontal axis. Note this too has its
limitations. The strategic segments of the poor majority that can be organised (trade
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unionists in the industrial belt) may not be the neediest of the poor, and their interests may
not coincide fully with those of the unorganised. More seriously, they may be unable to
achieve lasting and socially legitimate redistribution unless they can find allies within
dissident elite sectors. Over time the horizontal model may therefore depart from its
ideological origins, and come to look more like the multi-class vertical structure
championed by its competitor. This is not to say that the PT and the PFL become
indistinguishable, either in social composition or in ideology. But as they become more
successful and entrenched they may come increasingly to reflect the inequalities and
hierarchies of the surrounding society.
This does not mean that it is impossible to rectify the entrenched political inequalities
(both formal and informal) discussed above. Democratization, decentralization, division
and diffusion of powers, subsidiarity, and accountability can all be advanced in ways that
gradually increase the responsiveness of the political system to the interests and
aspirations of the poor majority. But if so this will come about through protracted (and
erratic) processes of social contestation and political learning. It cannot be simply decreed
from above or read off from some predictable set of institutional prescriptions.
Over the past decade, Brazil has manifested patterns of incremental political reform and
adaptation which offer encouragement that deep-rooted political inequality can be
gradually overcome. The near universalisation of social policy coverage, together with
more reliable enforcement of political (though not to the same extent civil) rights, helps
shift the balance of expectations and capabilities in a more equitable direction. Much more
needs to be done, and it is an open question whether the Lula administration can extend
this process or consolidate these gains. However, Brazil offers reassurance that it may at
least be possible.  The new "zero hunger" strategy is a political as well as social policy,
which could in principle lead to more equitable and participatory governance.
Brazil may be modestly encouraging, but most of the evidence - especially from South
America - is discouraging and has shown that slippages, policy reversals, and even
downward spirals as well as political learning can threaten to entrench even more
regressive structures of political inequality.
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Inequality in access to legal institutions
Inequalities in the access to political power will determine closely the performance of
legal institutions. Typically public legal systems, systems of protection of property,
prisons and so forth benefit citizens largely in proportion to their levels of wealth or
investment (Bénabou, 2000; Genn, 1999). Although it is not easy to detect who chooses to
litigate, developed countries have recognised that the poor do not bring up legal
grievances when the law would permit them to do so (Genn, 1999). In the development
context, this has been acknowledged by the Asian Development Bank, who perceives legal
empowerment as a development goal where law can be used to increase disadvantaged
populations’ control over their lives (Asian Development Bank, 2000).
In the context of Latin America, the Inter-America Development Bank has begun, since
1994, to fund an ‘access to justice’ project (Domingo and  Sieder, 2001), in order to
guarantee equality in legal protection for deprived population groups, particularly the
poor, ethnic minorities and women. These groups have traditionally been denied equal
access to Latin America’s judicial system (Hammergren et al., 2002). Courts are typically
located in urban areas and other zones where deprived groups do not live and may have
difficulties of access. The groups often cannot afford normal judicial processes. Even
those supposed to be free include hidden costs – counsel, documents, bribes,
transportation, etc – that are above the limited financial capacity of the poor. In addition,
the type of language and concepts used are often difficult to grasp by those with limited
literary abilities and those that speak minority languages. The view that the judicial system
in Latin America is characterised by discrimination and prejudice contributes towards
distrust and altogether avoidance by most citizens (Hammergren et al., 2002). In view of
this situation, it is important that the new ‘access to justice’ policies address the degree of
discrimination and corruption and encourage the widespread of information in order to
reduce the extent of inequalities within the Latin America judicial systems.
3.4. Summary and discussion28
The sections above examined in detail the extent of economic, social and political
inequalities in Latin America, across different regions, locations and population groups.
The empirical evidence discussed suggested that Latin American countries not only have
one of the highest levels of income inequality in the world, but are also characterised by
serious social and political inequalities. The table below provides a snapshot of the
evidence analysed in the sections above for a group of selected Latin American countries
where comparisons across all aspects of inequality were permitted by the available data.
When possible, the table includes also estimates for OECD countries, Asia and sub-
Saharan Africa in order to facilitate comparisons.





























Argentina 0.0 - 0.49 0.86 - - - - 7600
Bolivia 0.1 13.0 0.60 0.77 77 52 22.5 - 1010
Brazil 0.4 9.7 0.59 0.85 - - 20.9 - 4420
Chile 0.2 13.5 0.56 - - - - - 4740
Colombia 0.0 15.7 0.56 0.77 - - - - 2250
El Salvador 0.3 4.1 0.55 0.81 - - - - 1900
Guatemala - - 0.56 0.85 47 25 32.3 - 1660
Honduras 0.0 17.0 0.58 0.78 80 56 - - 760
Mexico 1.1 30.2 0.54 - - - - - 4400
Nicaragua 0.1 3.0 0.60 0.31 100 60 - - 430
Peru 0.9 19.6 0.51 0.91 - - - - 2390
Latin
America
0.5 12.2 0.56 0.78 84 54 25.21 0.43 3840
OECD - - 0.37 0.59 - - 0.0 0.24 25730
Asia - - 0.34 0.54 92 71 35.0 0.50 840
Sub-Saharan
Africa
- - 0.45 0.62 84 50 - 0.75 500
Source: (1) and (2) from table 2 in previous section. (3) from table in the statistical appendix to this project (latest available
Gini coefficient). (4) from table 5 in previous section; data for Latin America as a whole, OECD, Asia and sub-Saharan
Africa was calculated from IFAD (2001). (5) and (6) from table 6 in previous section; data for Latin America as a whole,
OECD, Asia and sub-Saharan Africa was calculated from IFAD (2001). (7) from table 7 in previous section; data for Latin
America as a whole, OECD, Asia and sub-Saharan Africa was calculated from IFAD (2001). (8) from table 1 in section
3.1. (9) from World Bank (2001).
Notes: 1. Refers to average of data available for three countries and thus not very representative of Latin America as a
whole.
Table 11 provides a brief illustration of economic (income and land) and social (health and
education) inequalities in Latin America, as well as gender, regional and urban/rural
inequalities. Unfortunately, it was not possible to include a political dimension into the
table, as data on political inequalities is scarce. Nonetheless, the table provides a good29
illustration of the extent of economic and social inequalities in Latin American countries,
in comparison to other world regions.
The table shows clearly that the persistence of high inequalities is not a problem
necessarily related to low incomes as Latin American countries, which have incomes on
average above Asian and sub-Saharan countries, have also the highest levels of income
and social inequalities in the world. As illustrated in the table, inequality in Latin America
is higher than in OECD countries and than in Asian and sub-Saharan African countries, in
most categories represented in the table. The only variable in which Latin American
countries perform slightly better is access to health services in rural areas. However,
although this estimate is higher in Latin America than in sub-Saharan Africa, it is still
lower than in Asian and OECD countries.
The extent of income and social inequalities in Latin America varies from country to
country, although, in general, there is a clear juxtaposition between the different aspects of
inequality represented in table 11. For instance, Brazil, which has one of the highest levels
of income inequality in the world (0.59), has also one of the highest levels of land
inequality in Latin America. The highest levels of land inequality are, however, observed
in Peru (see Justino and Acharya, 2003), which also has some of the highest levels of
gender and regional inequalities in Latin America. Guatemala provides another example of
a clear concurrence between inequalities. According to table 11, Guatemala has
experienced very high levels of land inequality, combined with the highest levels of health
and education inequalities in Latin America. In fact, access to health services and literacy
rates are much lower in Guatemala than in sub-Saharan African countries, which have on
average half of Guatemala’s income. Moreover, the extent of health and education
inequalities in Latin America are likely to be underestimated as the results in table 11 do
not take into account the lack of quality of public health and education systems in Latin
America, discussed in previous sections.
The high level and persistence of economic, social and political inequalities in Latin
America has had, as discussed in previous sections, a significantly negative impact on the
capacity of the various countries in the region to reduce poverty and stimulate economic
growth. This impact will be analysed in further detail in the next section. Section 5 will30
discuss, in turn, what can be done by governments, the civil society and the international
community to reduce inequalities in Latin America.31
4. THE ROLE OF INEQUALITY IN DEVELOPMENT
Why should academic researchers and policy-makers care about inequality at all? One
important fact about Latin America is that the majority of poor people in the region
(around 70%) do not live in poor countries. The evidence presented in the previous section
suggests that these people remain poor due to the persistence of high levels of economic,
social and political inequalities. They are poor because high levels of inequality create
exclusion and pockets of persistent poverty amongst certain population groups, not
because they live in low income countries. This has serious implications for achieving the
Millennium Development Goals and for the successful implementation of development
policies, not only in low- but also middle-income countries.
As discussed in section 2, although the concepts of inequality, poverty and exclusion are
not equivalent, high levels of inequality are likely to be correlated with forms of social,
economic and political exclusion and with both the structure and level of poverty in any
given society. Its impact can be direct, when it affects how households and individuals
access economic (markets, employment, etc), social (education, health, etc) and political
(voting, political organisations, etc) institutions. Or it can have an indirect impact by
affecting the rate of economic growth in a given economy and, consequently, the income
and consumption levels of the various population groups. Several studies, discussed in
section 3.1., have shown that the slow process in the reduction of poverty in Latin
America has been negatively affected by the worsening of income distribution (see, for
instance, Birdsall and Londoño, 1997). Work on the direct impact of inequality on poverty
is, however, scarce.
14 It is nonetheless well documented that growth is less effective in
reducing poverty in high inequality countries (McKay, 1997;  Hanmer and  Naschold,
2000). For instance, Ravallion (1997) shows that at any positive rate of growth, the higher
the initial inequality, the lower the rate at which income-poverty falls. He also shows that
it is possible for inequality to be sufficiently high to result in increases in poverty despite
improvements in economic growth. This is because inequality has a large effect on the
poverty-elasticity of growth (Naschold, 2002). More equitable distributions of income and
assets lead to improved opportunities for the poor and, consequently, to better living
standards.32
Despite this evidence, economists have disagreed as to whether income inequality has
positive or negative effects upon the economy’s growth and development (Justino, 2001).
Classical economists (Adam Smith, Ricardo) believed that there was a trade-off between
economic growth and economic equality: redistributing income to the poor would
decrease the share of national income available for saving and accumulation, and thus the
potential for economic growth would also be diminished.
15 This classical view was taken
up by the neoclassical economists.
Modern economics has, however, found very difficult to deal with the issue of
redistribution unless it consisted of lump-sum transfers implemented by the state. These
are the best possible solution because they yield a pure income effect and are thus non-
distortionary. However, lump-sum transfers are very difficult if not impossible to
implement, both in developed and developing countries, because the information on which
the state should base differential lump-sum taxes is not observable, or is observable only
at great cost, and individuals have an incentive not to reveal it. Nonetheless, following the
idea that redistribution hurts the potential for saving, neoclassical economists argued that
developing countries should concentrate on building their markets and achieving
economic growth, rather than wasting their scarce economic and political resources on the
implementation of  distortive, growth-constraining redistributive policies. Increased
aggregate income and production would eventually ‘trickle-down’ into the general
improvement in living conditions and the decrease in poverty and inequality.
Empirical evidence for the trade-off between economic growth and inequality was
provided by  Kuznets (1955), who noted that income inequality (measured by the
percentage of total income held by the top 5% group) seemed to have declined in the
USA, the UK and Germany, in the early 20th century, some time after an increase in these
countries’ real per capita income. Based on this evidence, Kuznets put forward his famous
hypothesis of an inverted-U relationship between inequality and economic growth,
illustrated in the figure below. The figure shows that at low levels of development,
                                                                                                                                                  
14 Most likely because research on non-income dimensions of inequality is also scarce. See, however, new
work on the measurement of non-income inequalities by Justino (2003).
15 This conclusion was founded upon two important assumptions: that the poor save less than the rich, and
that saving was the central variable determining economic growth.33
inequality will be low since all population groups are poor. As the country’s income
increases, inequality also increases as some population groups will become better-off
while others will not benefit as much from more favourable economic conditions. At
higher levels of income, inequality will start to decrease as higher incomes will trickle-
down into those population groups that did not benefit as much initially. At the end of the
development process the country will find a new equilibrium characterised by high
incomes and low inequality.
FIGURE 1 – KUZNETS’ INVERTED-U CURVE
Kuznets’ study was supported by later empirical and theoretical studies - Kuznets (1963),
Adelman and Morris (1973), Ahluwalia (1976), Taylor and Bacha (1976), Greenwood and
Jovanovic (1990), Anand and Kanbur (1993), Forbes (2001) - who found theoretical and
empirical evidence to confirm the inverted-U curve hypothesis, using much larger sample
sizes and different measures of inequality.
This evidence was challenged by the ‘redistribution with growth’ theories, initiated by
Chenery et al. (1974). Followers of this approach argued that a trade-off need not arise if
socially protective and redistributive policies such as better education, improved health
care, and targeted social security systems were implemented in the initial stages of
Income
Inequality34
development. These results were further confirmed by Cline (1975), Fields (1980, 1988)
16
and, more recently, Ahmad,  Drèze, Hills and  Sen (1991),  Guhan (1992), Bowles and
Gintis (1995), Drèze, Sen and Hussain (1995), Bowman (1997) and Ravallion and Datt
(1999). These theories showed that it was not empirically clear that economic growth
would always be accompanied by social development and equality, due to “large segments
of poverty that persist due to the inability of some sections of the population to participate
in the growth process” ( Gaiha and  Kulkarni, 1998: 145). In addition, income growth
processes do not necessarily include distributional mechanisms that guarantee that those
worse-off will benefit from increases in aggregate income (Justino, 2001; Killick, 2002).
This does not necessarily imply that economic growth is not necessary for the provision of
better living conditions. Economic growth is indeed an important factor in the promotion
of sustainable development strategies because not only it increases individual and
aggregate endowments and public resources, but it also provides the financial basis for the
continuing provision of social protection. This is particularly true of very low income
economies that cannot rely on indefinite increases in public expenditure on social services
without sustained increase in their taxable income base (Justino, 2001). However,
economic growth per se does not guarantee that those in most acute need will benefit
proportionately from increased incomes and thus inequalities that arise from the process of
economic growth itself must be addressed. Furthermore, the investment of public funds on
the reduction of inequality can generate important economic, social and political benefits
that are usually overlooked by modern welfare economics and forms of redistribution such
as programmes of public employment, investment in public education, land reforms and
the reinforcement of legal and political rights can benefit the poor without distorting
investment decisions (see Bénabou, 1996). This view has received strong support in recent
years with the publication of empirical and theoretical results showing that inequality can
harm economic growth and socio-economic development via several economic, social and
political mechanisms.
                                                
16 Fields proposed a new perspective by changing the focus of the debate to the question of whether a certain
type of growth promotes or hinders distribution, rather than focusing on the more traditional question of
whether a certain pattern of distribution promotes or hinders growth. Fields’ studies show that the trade-off
between equality and growth only takes place for a certain type of growth, namely for growth strategies that
overlook the fact that an initial high economic growth rate may have negative social effects. However, those
effects can be smoothened by the implementation of adequate redistributive polices.35
4.1. Economic mechanisms
High levels of inequality impact negatively on economic growth and, consequently, affect
other economic and social variables through several economic mechanisms. In this paper,
we focus on three economic mechanisms that have been particularly relevant to the
process of development in Latin America in recent decades. The first is the relationship
between high levels of inflation and high levels of inequality. The second mechanism
relates to the problem of increasing national demand in order to stimulate economic
growth. The final mechanism is economic (especially, trade) liberalisation. Although these
three mechanisms have been notably significant in Latin America, they are sufficiently
general to be applied to other economies characterised by high and/or increasing levels of
inequality.
4.1.1. Inequality and inflation
17
Monetary policy is a powerful macroeconomic management tool, with important poverty
and inequality effects. In the short run, an expansionary monetary policy may lead to
higher aggregate demand and increased output growth. This can result in the creation of
jobs (probably leading to lower unemployment levels) and, due to a tighter labour market,
wages may increase. Both these factors are likely to reduce poverty levels, through the
increase of average incomes. If the creation of new jobs occurs primarily in the unskilled
sector (thus affecting the poor), an expansionary monetary policy can also have positive
distributional effects. However, these poverty and distribution effects tend to be temporary
(especially when initial spare capacity is not large and the policy package is conducted
erratically) and an expansionary monetary policy may result in an increase of inflation.
Higher inflation will result, in turn, in the adoption of tighter monetary policies, which
may lead to reduced economic activity. As a consequence, the positive poverty and
distributional effects associated with the expansionary phase may disappear. It is further
argued that the effects during the phases of expansion and contraction are not symmetric,
with the latter being larger than the former,
18 resulting in a net outcome of increased
poverty and worsened inequality over the whole economic cycle.
                                                
17 This section draws on Gottschalk (2003).
18 Due to the element of uncertainty caused by increased inflation, which may lead to a distortion of price
signals, misallocation of resources and the discouragement of potential investors. This often results in lower36
During the 1970s and 1980s, periods of high inflation were common in Latin America.
19
This phenomenon is believed to have contributed to poor growth performance and,
through various mechanisms, to increases in inequality. In addition, high levels of
inequality have created large constraints to the adequate management of macroeconomic
policies and, consequently, have emphasised further the negative effects of high inflation.
High levels of inflation in Latin America have had a serious long-term impact on
inequality in the region. One of the most important channels was the functioning of the
labour markets. In Latin America, the very poor (rural and urban), which tend to be self-
employed or under-employed, are normally poorly organised and, consequently, lack the
means to protect their earnings against inflation. Although strong labour unions exist, their
members tend to be better off semi- or skilled workers from the most dynamic segments of
the manufacturing sector.
20 In addition, the poor generally do not have access to current
bank accounts. Instead, they hold cash and therefore are subject to inflation tax. The rich
and affluent, on the other hand, have access to remunerated bank accounts in which their
current income can be protected against inflation. They can also protect their personal
savings through access to inflation-corrected financial instruments. Furthermore, the
consumption basket of the poor is less diversified than that of the rich. Because high
inflation is usually also associated with high price dispersion, the poor have thus less room
to change their consumption pattern in response to a change in relative prices than the rich.
This will naturally have important negative distributive effects.
In recent years, most Latin American countries achieved price stability, which has had
positive distributive effects (see  Gottschalk, 2003). However, as argued in  Gottschalk
(2003), these countries continued to face serious macroeconomic problems. The surge of
capital flows in larger countries (mainly Mexico, Brazil and Argentina) caused a number
of problems associated with the volatility of such flows,
21 whereas smaller Latin American
countries remained dependent on official flows (mainly provided by international financial
                                                                                                                                                  
wages and lower human capital investment, which may affect disproportionately labour-intensive industries
and thus poor unskilled workers.
19 And even hyperinflation in Argentina, Brazil, Nicaragua and Peru.
20 Such as the car industry in Brazil.
21 Griffith-Jones and Kimmis (2003) provide a detailed analysis of the Mexican, Brazilian and Argentinean
crises.37
institutions). These usually come attached to a series of conditionalities that require tight
fiscal and monetary policies, which have in the past increased the vulnerability of these
economies to external shocks. All these problems have had negative poverty and
inequality effects and were, in turn, intensified by the existence of large inequalities. The
Latin America experience with inflation suggests thus that the higher the initial inequality,
the higher the negative impact of inflation on the prospects for economic and social
development.
4.1.2. Demand mechanism
Latin American countries, in particular smaller more vulnerable economies, face the
dilemma of having to enhance long-term growth and stimulate domestic demand to offset
economic slowdown caused by external factors such as the volatility of capital flows and
world economic recessions. In face of an external shock that causes, for instance, an
increase in unemployment, the income of poor households would fall.
22 Lack of physical
and financial assets means that poor households will have difficulties in adjusting to
external shocks. Consequently, their demand will fall. Given that unemployment tends to
affect the poor disproportionately and that they constitute the majority of the population in
a country where inequality is high, aggregate demand would be strongly affected. As
discussed in Gottschalk (2003), under this reasoning, the higher the inequality of incomes
and assets, the higher the degree of volatility the country is subject to.
Murphy et al. (1989) show that internal demand can change as a response to more equal
distributions of income. Decreases in income inequality imply a wealthier middle class
(enlarged by those coming out of the poorer classes), which are “the natural consumers of
manufactured goods” (pp. 538). This is to a certain extent an extension of the Kaleckian
idea that a concentration of wealth amongst the richest classes manifests itself in the
increase of demand for luxuries rather than internally produced manufactures (Kalecki,
1976). As argued by Murphy et al., a very unequal society implies that an “extreme
concentration of wealth in the hands of the very rich manifest itself in the demand for
handmade and imported luxuries rather than for domestic manufactures, even when farm
or export income grows” (pp. 538). Consequently, the reduction of inequalities is likely to
                                                
22 See Gottschalk (2003).38
induce an increase in private consumption and, consequently, an enlargement of internal
markets and higher prospects for economic growth.
4.1.3. Inequality and trade liberalisation
Most Latin American countries have been through large programmes of economic
liberalisation in recent years, of which trade liberalisation has been one of the largest
components. These programmes are likely to have affected and have been affected by the
level and persistence of inequality in Latin America. On the one hand, existing inequalities
will affect the propensity for the establishment of pro-poor trade policies (see Justino,
2003). On the other hand, trade liberalisation will affect both the level and structure of
inequality within a given economy. By effecting prices and employment structures (see
McCulloch, Winters and Cirera, 2001), trade liberalisation policies will lead to
differentiation between ( i) households or individuals that are net producers or net
consumers of commodities for which price changes and (ii) skilled/non-skilled workers
employed in industries and/or sectors affected by trade policies (Woods, 1994). Taylor
(2000), for instance, argues that income inequality could rise if displaced unskilled
workers end up in informal service sector activities for which there is a declining demand.
Trade liberalisation programmes can bring, in the aggregate, long-run benefits for poor
economies in terms of new market opportunities and increased average incomes. Although
there is little conclusive empirical evidence that trade liberalisation and market openness
leads to increased economic growth, results have shown that, in the long-run, economic
and trade openness will not harm the prospective for economic growth (Rodriguez and
Rodrik, 1999). However, in the short-run, trade liberalisation policies induce social and
economic shocks of various degrees that result from the emergence of new markets,
changes in relative prices, the remuneration of different factors of production and the
disappearance of traditional economic relations. These shocks are likely to have an impact
on everyone in an economy, but some groups may be more vulnerable to shocks, both in
terms of their exposure to shocks and their ability to adjust to them (Glewwe and Hall,
1998; Winters, 2000). As argued in Gottschalk (2003), inability to deal with unexpected
external shocks is a serious macro-management problem in Latin American countries,
especially in smaller economies, as they have fewer instruments to cope with sharp39
income and output declines and increases in unemployment. These, in general, will affect
disproportionately the poorest segments of the population.
In the long-run, resource endowments, economic structure and trade barriers provide the
basis for understanding the way in which trade policy reform is likely to affect income
distribution (Evans, 2003). When countries with a low skill/resource ratio (Argentina,
Bolivia, Chile and Peru) expand their resource intensive exports, they will tend to
experience rising resource rents relative to skilled wages and, given ownership
concentration of resources, a rise in inequality. On the other hand, countries with a
medium skill/resource ratio (such as Mexico and Brazil), that export skill-abundant
manufactures, will probably experience a rise in skilled wages relative to resource rents.
To the extent that unskilled wages are pegged by unemployment or other mechanisms that
limit unskilled wages, these may result in an increase of wage inequality.
The links between trade liberalisation, poverty and inequality in developing countries are,
however, difficult to assess empirically due in part to a lack of adequate data (in particular
reliable and representative household surveys) and the difficulties in measuring both trade
openness, poverty and inequality (see McCulloch, Winters and Cirera, 2001).
Furthermore, trade liberalisation usually occurs as part of a policy package and it is
difficult to separate trade shocks from other macroeconomic shocks associated with trade
liberalisation. In addition, the experiences of countries where important trade reforms have
been implemented have been rather mixed and have not allowed for empirical
generalisations.
23 In Latin America, these complications are further emphasised by the
high volatility of macroeconomic variables, which is difficult to disentangle from pure
distributional effects. For instance, Brazil enjoyed a slight improvement in income
distribution following the implementation of trade reforms in the 1990s (see table in
statistical appendix). However, according to Taylor (2000), this was partly due to the
elimination of inflation, as well as to the increase in the relative demand for unskilled
workers.
                                                
23 McCulloch, Winters and Cirera (2001) have, however, proposed one way of analysing these links by
exploring the transmission mechanisms from trade reforms to household incomes and expenditures via their
direct effects on product markets and labour (and other factors) markets and, indirectly, through changes in
government revenue and public expenditure on social sectors.40
The understanding of the links between trade liberalisation and inequality is further
complicated by the fact that trade policy reforms can be carried out carried out in the
context of regional economic integration or in a wider multilateral trade policy reform
process (WTO rounds). The study of the welfare effects of trade policy liberalisation is
greatly obscured when regional integration is involved (Evans, 2003). Usually, regional
integration involves some gains from trade form trade creation and some losses from trade
diversion.
24 The final impact of trade on income distribution will depend on which factors
of production benefit from an increase in their relative demand. However, it may well
happen that the comparative advantage of one country will be different in the case of
regional integration and in the case of multilateral liberalisation. For example, as
illustrated in Evans (2003), Argentina has a comparative advantage in agriculture with
respect the rest of the world due to its land endowments. Nevertheless, Argentina has a
comparative advantage in skilled workers with most of Latin America. Thus, the
distributional effects of regional or multilateral types of trade liberalisation may differ. In
the case of multilateral liberalisation, it can be expected that Argentina will specialise in
agriculture and the food industry, increasing the returns of land and low skilled wages in
the food processing industry. In the case of regional integration, income distribution may
benefit high skilled workers the most.
Latin American countries, in general, have not been very successful in improving the
living standards of their population after periods of liberalisation (Winters, 2000). Taylor
(2000) provides a summary of the distributional impact of trade liberalisation in Latin
American countries, illustrated in the table below.
TABLE 12 - GROWTH AND DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACTS OF TRADE LIBERALISATION IN LATIN
AMERICA
Distributional impacts Effect on growth
Favourable Neutral Unfavourable
Positive Chile (post-1990) Peru Argentina (until 1997-98)




Neutral Costa Rica Brazil India
                                                
24 Trade creation occurs when an economic union leads to the growth of intra union trade that exploits
comparative advantage. Trade diversion takes place when an economic union leads to an expansion in intra-
union trade in products involving a comparative disadvantage.41
Cuba Korea
Turkey Mexico (until 1995)






Only Chile seems to have benefited recently from a simultaneously favourable impact on
growth and income distribution. In the majority of the Latin America countries
represented in table 12, the distributional effect of trade liberalisation policies has been
unfavourable. Taylor (2000) reports further that inequality of primary incomes increased
in most Latin American countries following the trade liberalisation policies in the 1990s.
This was mainly driven by an increase in wage differentials between skilled and unskilled
workers. These negative distributional effects may, however, represent initial shocks that
the different economies may be able to correct in the future. If that is the case, Latin
America should not reduce the size of their liberalisation programmes but rather intensify
the process, at the same time that systems of support and compensation for those that are
most negatively affected by the new reforms is put in place. Particular attention should be
paid to the guarantee of more equal access to political power by the more disadvantaged
population groups since, as liberalised markets become more productive, there is an
increased risk that those with increased market power will capture the benefits of
economic reforms. This risk is particularly high when regulatory policies are weak – as in
most of Latin America - and the majority of the population is below the poverty line. In
order to avoid this situation, the governments in Latin America must prioritise integration
policies that weaken the monopoly of vested interests, force the implementation of more
accountable welfare programmes and strengthened the social and political position of key
groups such as indigenous populations, women, children, trade unions and so forth.
4.2. Social mechanisms
High levels of inequality can harm economic growth and development not only through
economic mechanisms, but also through two important social mechanisms. The first is a
human capital mechanism, whereby high inequality hinders prospects for economic
growth because it implies that large numbers of individuals do not have access to adequate42
health care and education. This, in turn, will affect their ability to access more prosperous
life opportunities. In addition, high levels of inequality usually impede social cohesion, by
creating social discontent - the second social mechanism – and thus increasing society’s
propensity for crime, violence and other forms of socio-political instability. These
mechanisms are discussed in the sections that follow.
4.2.1. Human capital mechanisms
Inequality harms growth because it leads to a decrease in the stock in human capital in the
economy and thus to a decrease in individuals’ capacity to access better jobs and higher
incomes. The stock of human capital in a given society depends on several variables,
namely, on the health status of individuals and households, their education level and their
access to social protection systems. For instance, Ribero and Nuñez (1999) analyse how
public and private investments in health in Colombia are related to future earnings of
individuals. Their results show that disability and stature (an indication of nutrition status)
influence significantly the earnings capacity of men and women. As we discussed in
section 3.3.2., health inequalities are quite high in Latin America, not because the poor do
not have access to health care but rather because they have access to a ‘second rate’
system of health care. Poor health care leads to increased levels of malnutrition, increased
mortality rates and, consequently, to lower availability of human capital in the country.
Education inequalities are also quite high in Latin America (see section 3.3.2.). Galor and
Zeira (1993), Saint-Paul and Verdier (1992) and Perotti (1993) look at education as the
human capital mechanism that relates inequality and economic growth. In  Galor and
Zeira’s paper, public education is favourable for growth because it increases the level of
human capital and, simultaneously, produces a more even income distribution. At the
same time, public education will be transmitted across generations and, thus, it will also
affect the redistribution of income in the long run.
Perotti, on the other hand, looks at the impact of income distribution on growth, when
investment in human capital is assumed to be the source of growth and individuals vote
over the degree of redistribution in the economy. In Perotti’s paper, income distribution is
not given and can be modified by the tax system. By affecting the post-tax income of the
various income groups, redistribution will determine which groups will be able to invest in43
human capital and which groups will remain unskilled. This, in turn, will affect economic
growth and how income distribution evolves over time. The model highlights an
externality effect of investment in human capital: investment in education by one class
will increase the future income of all other classes, thus enabling an increasing number of
classes to invest in education over time. As a consequence, growth will tend to increase
over time. These results are confirmed indirectly by Alesina and Perotti (1993): “a wealthy
middle class [their equivalent to equitable distribution] can afford investment in higher
education while an impoverished one cannot” (pp. 16). This research suggests thus that
education inequalities of the type observed in some Latin American countries can severely
harm prospects for economic growth.
Brimmer (1966, 1995), quoted in Justino and Litchfield (2002), designs two ways of
estimating the economic cost for society derived from educational discrimination. These
methods can also inform us on the extent of education inequalities and the consequent
discrimination and exclusion of certain groups from accessing educational opportunities.
25
One method is to simply calculate the gains in total output and income that would arise
from the full use of the existing education, skills and experience of the excluded group.
The second method calculates the gains that would arise if we made use of the potential
skills, education and experience of that group. Zoninsein (2001a, 2001b) has estimated the
gains to earnings and GDP for four Latin American countries, Bolivia Brazil, Guatemala
and Peru, plus South Africa and the US from removing discrimination in the labour
markets and in the access to education. His results are summarised in table 13 below and
show that all countries in their study would benefit largely from removing education
inequalities between population groups. In Bolivia, Brazil and Guatemala, the earnings
gains from removing education discrimination would be above 60%. This effect increases
if labour market discrimination (of ethnic minorities, women, etc) is simultaneously
removed.






Earnings GDP Earnings GDP Earnings GDP
Bolivia (1997) 57.8% 17.12% 66.1% 19.56% 123.9% 36.68%
Brazil (1997) 36.7% 4.85% 60.3% 7.98% 97.0% 12.83%
                                                
25 See Justino and Litchfield (2002) for details.44
Guatemala (1998) 32.2% 4.59% 63.5% 9.04% 95.8% 13.63%
Peru (1997) 35.9% 1.76% 50.0% 2.45% 85.9% 4.21%
Brazil (1990) - - - - 24.94% 9.04%
South Africa (1993) - - - - 183.70% 96.60%
United States (1992) 2.70% - 2.04% - 4.74% 2.80%
Source: Justino and Litchfield (2002) from tables 1 and 2, Zoninsein (2001a) and Table 12.1 Zoninsein
(2001b).
4.2.2. Socio-political instability and inequality
Inequality can harm economic growth if it leads to the accumulation of discontent
amongst some population groups to a sufficiently high level to break social cohesion. As
argued by Alesina and Perotti (1993), “Income inequality increases social discontent and
fuels social unrest. The latter, by increasing the probability of coups, revolutions, mass
violence or, more generally, by increasing policy uncertainty and threatening property
rights, has a negative effect on investment and, as a consequence, reduces growth” (pp. 1).
Bénabou (1996) adds further that “when the gap between rich and poor widens, the latter
may have a greater temptation to engage in rent-seeking or predatory activities at the
expense of the former [which decreases investment and growth]” (pp. 18). Thus, “it may
then be in the interest of the rich to collectively transfer wealth to the poor through land
reform, education subsidies, a minimum wage, or trade protection” (pp. 18). In addition,
Alesina, Roubini, Özler and Swagel (1992) have found evidence which shows that “in
countries and time periods with a high propensity of government collapse, growth is
significantly lower than otherwise” (pp. 1).
26
Empirical evidence for a positive relationship between inequality and various forms of
social and political conflict has been suggested in an extensive literature (Olson, 1963;
Sigelman and Simpson, 1977; Hardy, 1979;  Weede, 1981, 1987; Muller, 1985; Park,
1986; Muller and Seligson, 1987; Midlarsky, 1988; Londregan and Poole, 1990; Boswell
and Dixon, 1990; Brockett, 1992;  Binswanger,  Deininger and  Feder, 1993;  Schock,
1996).
27 Recent literature on the economic causes of civil wars in developing countries has
also identified poverty and inequality as possible causes of this extreme type of conflict.
Stewart (1998) discusses several case studies which show evidence for a positive
relationship between horizontal inequalities and civil conflict in Cambodia, El Salvador,
                                                
26 The study does not, however, infer on the issue of causality.45
Nicaragua, Guatemala, Haiti, Burundi, Rwanda, Afghanistan, Somalia, Sierra Leone and
Liberia. Elbadawi (1999) finds also that the extent of ethnic fractionalisation (an important
variable in the determination of social inequality) in segmented societies may increase the
probability of civil wars taking place. Dollar, Easterly and  Gatti (2000) find similar
results. Their work focuses on the causes of political assassinations, guerrilla wars, coups,
revolutions, riots and genocide, rather than full-scale wars. Although they do not find
statistically significant relationships between their income inequality variable and the
conflict variables, they do find that ethnic fragmentation may contribute towards an
increase in the probability of guerrilla activity and revolutions emerging in a given society.
Latin America has in general high and increasing levels of crime, violence and political
instability that coexist with a high degree of inequality and low economic growth (table
14). These can, in some circumstances, be traced to severe differences in income, access to
social institutions and political voice between distinct regions, locations and population
groups.
TABLE 13 - CRIME RATES BY REGIONS (1985-1995)
Number of crimes per 100 000 inhabitants









Africa 8 36.0 34.4 5.1 2.5
Asia 10 13.4 7.6 5.4 2.1
Latin America and the Caribbean 17 200.5 172.0 14.0 8.5
Eastern and Central Europe 15 28.3 23.0 6.8 7.1
Western Europe 16 54.4 54.0 4.4 3.8
Other high income countries 8 87.3 54.0 3.2 2.2
Source: Bourguignon (1999).
Bourguignon (1999) estimates that the social and economic costs of crime in Latin
America can be as much as 7% of the GDP (and this may be a conservative estimate), in
contrast with 2% of most developed countries (table 15). The paper does not infer on the
consequences of this level of criminality on growth but suggests that “there may be a big
social payoff in making sure that economic development, and in particular the
urbanisation process which is more closely related to the evolution of crime, takes place
evenly and equitably” (pp. 2-3).
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TABLE 14 - ESTIMATES OF THE COST OF CRIME IN THE US AND IN LATIN AMERICA




“Transfers” = monetary amount of property crime (0.5) (1.5)
Monetary cost (medical expenses, opportunity cost of time, …) 0.2 0.6
Non-monetary cost (cost of pain) 0.7 2.1
Human capital loss (homicides) 0.4 1.7
Opportunity cost of incarceration 0.6 0.1
Criminal justice 1.3 1.6
Private crime prevention 0.6 1.4
Total 3.8 7.5
Source: Bourguignon (1999).
Fajnzylber, Lederman and Loayza (1998) have found that increases in income inequality
raise crime rates (homicide and robbery) in Latin America. Colombia experienced the
most noticeable increase in the homicide rate, from an average of approximately 16
intentional homicides per 100 000 inhabitants during 1970-74 to over 80 in 1990-94. This
result is likely to reflect the rise of the drug trafficking industry in the country, as well as
high levels of income inequality (table in statistical appendix) (see also Rubio, 1998). Of
the small countries, only Costa Rica has experienced a steady decline in its intentional
homicide rate.
Cruz et al. (1998) and Stewart (1998) examine these issues in El Salvador during the
1990s, where violence has escalated since the 1980s. Cruz et al show that after the 1980s,
El Salvador has registered some of the highest rates of crime in the world. Although this
could be due to increase in regional conflicts and traffic of drugs, homicides did not,
however, decrease with the end of the civil war. Inequality has not been identified as a
direct cause of violence in El Salvador. However, the high inequality registered in the
country (0.56 in 1998 and 0.55 in 1999) (table in statistical appendix) is not likely to have
been a positive influence on efforts to decrease violence in El Salvador. Stewart (1998)’s
work focuses on the civil war in El Salvador and discussed how extreme horizontal
inequalities between various population groups have provoked the violence and political
conflicts that have taken place in the country and that have resulted in a large-scale civil
war. Her work traces the conflicts in El Salvador to severe land inequalities and clashes47
between the interests of large landowners and the peasants, who suffered from poor access
to health and education and high unemployment rates. A similar situation has also taken
place in Nicaragua and Guatemala. In a more recent paper, Stewart (2002) discusses how
extreme inequalities between the white population and indigenous people in the state of
Chiapas in Mexico (referred to in the previous section) has resulted in serious armed
struggles between the Ejercito Zapatisto de Liberacion Nacional (EZLN) and the Mexican
state. In 1994, the EZLN took over 4 municipalities, while demanding autonomy for
indigenous communities, protection of their cultural heritage and actions towards
improving their economic and social living conditions.
Similar patterns of violence are also found in Brazil and Venezuela. In 1995, the number
of deaths caused by violence in Rio de Janeiro was over 800, higher than anything else
registered in previous decades (IADB, 1998). Violence is in its majority committed by
young males with low levels of education and with no noticeable job skills. Violence in
Rio was estimated to have cost a total of over 2 billion dollars in 1995, the equivalent to
5% of total income generated in the city (IADB, 1998).  Briceño-Leon et al. (1999)
estimates that the Venezuelan government spent around 351.4 million dollars in 1995
(112.9 million dollars in Caracas alone) in security. The main victims of crime are the
inhabitants of poor neighbourhoods, particularly in Caracas. This seems to be lead by the
fact that most white arms possession is higher amongst those with lower salaries, a clear
manifestation of the impact of inequalities on violence and crime.
4.3. Political mechanisms
High inequality can affect economic growth through political mechanisms that operate via
the voting process. The median-voter model has provided the main theoretical framework
to explain how voters’ preferences can relate inequality and economic growth. Persson
and  Tabellini (1991), using a two-period overlapping generations model in which
decisions are governed by a median-voter process, show that high initial levels of
inequality encourage the demand for redistributive taxes by the median voter. The higher
the initial degree of inequality, the higher the tax rate preferred by the median voter
because the less endowed with capital she/he is. A higher tax rate, in turn, benefits those
endowed with relatively less capital (i.e., more labour) and harms those endowed with
relatively more capital. These are also those that save, accumulate and invest. It follows,48
therefore, from the model assumptions that the higher the initial level of inequality, the
more redistribution will be demanded and, hence, the lower will be the prospects for
private invest and thus economic growth (see also Alesina and Rodrik, 1994).
The median-voter model suffers, however, from important shortcomings. One is that the
results provided by these models are driven by the fact that the only transfers considered
are those detrimental for growth (Saint-Paul and  Verdier, 1992; Bénabou, 1996).
However, taxation on capital is not the only form of redistributive policy available for
policy makers. Other forms of redistributive policies include programmes of public
employment, investment in public education, land reforms and so forth. These policies
would benefit those who receive a lower share of total income without distorting private
investment decisions.
It is also possible to imagine a situation where high inequality may lead to lower rather
than higher tax rates, when the richer population groups are capable of influencing the
design of the tax system through the political system (see Acharya, Schneider and Ugaz,
2003 and Gottschalk, 2003). Lower taxes, in turn, may affect economic growth negatively,
if the country is below its optimal tax level (Furman and Stiglitz, 1998). Thus, as argued in
Gottschalk (2003), two possible sequencing of events may arise from inequality: higher
taxes and lower growth, and lower taxes and lower growth. Many countries in Latin
America have low tax rates as a proportion of the GDP. In some cases this may reflect
structural deficiencies in the tax systems associated with their early stages of development.
However, political lobbying on the part of the elite may also partly explain these
governments’ low tax capacity (see Sachs, 1990). In richer countries, like Argentina, that
seems to be the case. Elites may create constraints to fiscal stabilisation programmes as
they are better able to protect their financial assets in periods of crisis than the poor,
through their access to various mechanisms, such as remunerated bank accounts and
indexed financial instruments (Gottschalk, 2003).
Other reasons outside the predictions of the median-voter model may also explain why
most Latin American countries are characterised by regressive policies. Median-voter
models of the type discussed above envisage that, given the skewed distribution of wealth
in Latin America, the median voter is located closer to the vast majority of poor voters
and, thus, policies targeted at the median voter should be pro-poor. However, Latin49
American countries have some of the most regressive policies in the world. This is
especially the case of recent privatisation programmes, analysed in Acharya, Schneider
and Ugaz (2003). What then, as asked by these authors, explains why Latin American
policymakers, supposedly interested in winning elections, would choose policies that
alienate poor voters and why would voters support them, as has often happened? The
standard median voter model predicts that voters will vote for redistributive policies if the
median voter’s income is lower than the population mean income. Though the median
voter in Latin America is generally poor, voters have not generally chosen the candidates
offering the most progressive policies. This is because, as suggested in Acharya,
Schneider and Ugaz (2003), citizens may be segregated by income, as a result of severe
inequalities and the provision of public goods is systematically concentrated for the rich
and excludes the poor. Limited access to information and uncertainty about future
outcomes create a status-quo bias that exacerbate this tendency and further disenfranchise
the poor. Also, as discussed above and in section 3.3.3., the link between inequality and
political participation creates barriers that prevent the poor from advancing their demands
in equal weight to the rich.
Furthermore, internal partisan dynamics can drive party platforms away from the
preferences of the poor as different echelons of parties compete to control the agenda.
When these intra-party dynamics are joined with inter-party competition, the results are
even more perverse. Competition along multiple issue dimensions can generate majorities
for regressive policies, especially when policymakers prioritise non-redistributive
dimensions, such as fiscal adjustment or physical security (Acharya, Schneider and Ugaz,
2003). This type of competition between political parties and interest groups is usually not
taken into account by the median voter model, which predicts that policies will ultimately
be decided by the outcome of the median-voter decision functions (see Atkinson, 1987).
This assumption is difficult to defend both in industrialised and developing countries
where political parties compete actively and voters’ decisions are influenced by that
competition (Justino, 2001). In addition, voters at any particular election may not
represent all income classes, particularly when the poor find costly to vote or are bought
out by richer voters.
Also, voters not only care about distribution but also care about issues such as religion,
race, cultural and ethnic identity, the consequences of fiscal chaos and national security,50
which influences strongly their voting patterns regarding distribution. In addition, in very
unequal societies, most voters are realistic about their lack of political leverage between
elections, and are aware that sweeping promises of social justice are unlikely to be
honoured. It is thus possible that views regarding non-redistributive policies are
sufficiently strong that the holder of those views is the decisive voter. Supposing that
mean wealth of the cohort of voters with these views is larger than the mean wealth in the
economy, then hardly any redistribution will take place, as the median voter would be
rational to support the candidate most likely to deliver some immediate and tangible
demand to a defined constituency, rather than to pin his/her hopes on a broad and long-
term campaign against overall inequality. Moreover, given this calculus, the tangible
benefit sought may have nothing to do with redistribution from the rich (always a risky
objective for vulnerable poor voters). Security, identity, traditional authority, region,
religion etc, could all be alternative axes of electoral appeal that might trump equality as
the basis for electoral success among median voters. For instance, in the recent Colombian
elections, the more left wing candidate Serpa had held an electoral lead up due to his
redistributive concerns until guerrilla attacks intensified. Serpa’s wing may have thus had
too little time to convince the voters that redistributive issues are just as important as the
security issues. Consequently, as argued in paper 2, the election was won on security
issues. Similar outcomes will depend, however, on the type of electoral procedure in
place. Whereas presidentialism (such as in Venezuela) may encourage the poor to vote for
the populist leaders, congressional elections, as in Brazil, can be structured to
counterbalance that.
Fiscal federalism and decentralization have been widely used to disperse control over
social spending to the local levels, where median voters have (sometimes) been
constrained from making populist or redistributive demands on the elected national
authorities. One key aspect of neo-liberal democratization is to broaden electoral
participation, to multiply the number of access points where voters may be consulted,
while shrinking the range of policy instruments that can be controlled by those they elect.
Strict controls imposed by the international financial institutions over national budgets,
increased restraints on spending and borrowing powers of local authorities and public-
private partnerships or local tax participation in federal social spending programmes tend
to create incentives for elected authorities at all levels to practice austerity and to compete
in generating market confidence, regardless of median voter desires. Most voters are not51
unaware of these constraints and, consequently, do not just blindly back the candidates
that make the most attractive promises. They learn (in an iterative voting process) which
platforms might be deliverable and which are just pious aspirations. This whole
institutional structure of neo-liberalised democratic governance transmits a bias against
voting for redistributive platforms, and in favour of other, more deliverable, policy
offerings.  Some of these may even be anti-egalitarian.
Two more features of electoral competition in contemporary Latin America may reinforce
this pro-status quo feature of median voter behaviour. Competitive elections are
expensive. Politicians who want to win election have to appeal to funders as well as to
voters. Those who fund election campaigns usually expect to recoup their investments if
their candidates succeed, and they do not normally have an interest in funding tax
reformers or welfare spenders. Thus, before candidates can even gain access to median
voters, they may be subjected to an anti-redistributive screening process by the business
community. In European social democracies this is countered by funding from trade
unions and other well-established mass organisations. In Latin America, conditions of
inequality, labour surplus and precarious employment tend to preclude that counterweight.
Even in Brazil, where the PSDB and the PT both claim social democratic inspiration, the
trade union interests that seem to support that position represent formal sector workers and
state employees (perhaps anxious about their pension privileges). These are in the upper
middle deciles of the income distribution and their interests may be at variance with those
of the median voter.
The second pro-status quo feature of electoral competition is the role of the media in
setting the agenda and filtering campaign offerings. Median voters are affected by the
mass media in general and television in particular. It is hard to think of any major media
channel in Latin America that is particularly sensitive to problems of inequality. Reliance
on advertising to fund programmes means that the interests of major corporations can be a
constraint on editorial choice and, more generally, that programming promotes a
consumerist and middle class world view, perhaps at variance with the objective material
circumstances of the median viewer. For instance, in 1989, Globo created the candidacy of
Collor de Melo, as a means to block Lula's bid for the presidency on a redistributive
platform feared by the business community. Lula lost because Collar campaigned
demagogically against so called “maharajas” of the public sector, and because the lowest52
two or three deciles in the income distribution system feared inflation and the threat to
their interests that might arise from a clash between left and right. In 2002, by contrast,
Globo ensured Lula's smooth accession to the presidency, in part because his redistributive
offerings were now greatly constrained by the disciplines of neo-liberal institutionalization
and, in part, because the collapse of the advertising market left the media at the mercy of
state patronage. Although these arguments require further work, it makes an important
illustration of how political processes can be influenced by considerations outside the
standard median-voter.
Venezuela provides another though different example of the failure of the median voter
model. In 1989, Carlos Andrés Perez and his AD party returned to office in Venezuela
following a campaign that led voters to expect a return to the “good old days” of oil-
financed public spending, as practiced by Perez in the 1970s. But, once in office, he
completely disregarded his electoral platform and switched to a “neo-liberal” or
“Washington consensus” economic strategy for which the electorate was completely
unprepared. This breach of trust with the median voter led to food riots, a coup attempt,
and the eventual impeachment of Perez and destruction of his party and the party system.
What we see in Venezuela is a dysfunctional democratic system, which can no longer
aggregate interests, legitimate policies, or implement coherent reforms. The median voter
no longer exists - there is a polarised electorate, two incompatible discourses offered by
rival branches of the media, and the prospect of an economic and political collapse. The
Venezuelan poor may have found a sense of common political identity, and even perhaps
a shared platform of redistributive reforms. But since they cannot carry the better-off half
of society with them they cannot secure consent for redistribution or for minimal
economic rationality. This is an extreme case, but unfortunately not unique: it presents, in
stark form, tendencies within democratic politics that can also be observed in several other
Latin American countries.53
5. WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT INEQUALITY?
The economic, social and political effects of inequality discussed in the section above
strongly suggests that inequalities must be reduced. Effective reduction of the type of
dysfunctional and persistent inequalities that characterise most Latin American countries
require concerted efforts from governments, the civil society and the international
community. This section addresses this issue. Section 5.1 examines the role of
governments, at the macro and micro level, in the reduction of inequalities in Latin
America, by discussing both the constraints and the possibilities they face. The section
considers also the interactions between government intervention and the participation of
the civil society in the process of inequality reduction in Latin America. Section 5.2
examines how seriously concerns for persistent inequalities have been taken by the main
international financial institutions (the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and
the Inter-American Development Bank) and how these institutions can contribute towards
the reduction of inequality in the region. Section 5.3 focuses on the particular role the UK
Department for International Development can play in the reduction and avoidance of
further economic, social and political inequalities in Latin America.
5.1. Governments and the civil society
As argued in Justino and Acharya (2003), dysfunctional inequalities arise due to the
existence of unequal distribution systems in society. They also arise because different
individuals face different opportunities and choices. Finally, forms of discrimination
inherent to the various societies (defined by historical processes or otherwise) may also
contribute towards the emergence of economic, social and political inequalities (Justino,


















The persistence of high levels of inequality in Latin America has been attributed to the
minimal role the state in Latin America has played in the economic and social life of its
citizens (see Justino and Acharya, 2003). An increase in the role of governments in Latin
America could thus strengthen economic, social and political rights and, consequently,
avoid severe forms of inequality. There are three particularly important areas where the
intervention of governments is of crucial importance in the process of inequality reduction
in Latin America. These three areas define a three-tier system of policies that include
(Justino and Acharya, 2003):
¤  the establishment of progressive tax systems, whereby income gets transferred from
the rich to the poor
¤  the promotion of equal opportunities by, for instance, implementing universal primary
and secondary education and universal access to primary health care and basic social
security benefits
¤  the encouragement of change in social attitudes regarding the discrimination,
segregation and exclusion of certain population groups from key economic, social and
political institutions. This last tier involves: (i) the guarantee of equal access to job
opportunities by all groups in the population (men and women, individuals of different
cultural backgrounds and so on); (ii) the protection of cultural differences and (iii) the
establishment of equal rights of access to socio-political and legal institutions by all
population groups (including indigenous people and African descendants).55
The implementation of this three-tier system of policies resumes, thus, to effectively
increasing the redistribution of not only income, assets and wealth, but also of social and
political rights (Justino and Acharya, 2003).
Redistributive policies – of either financial resources or social and political rights - are,
however, difficult to implement as some types of redistribution may introduce large
distortions on poor and/or middle-income countries that may result in further increases in
inequality (for instance, capital taxes that discourage investment). In addition, as we
argued above, those policies may be constrained by a lack of political will for
redistribution or pure opposition to redistribution by political and social elites, as well as
by weak economic management from governments involved in the pursuit of electoral
advantages, dominated by inadequate links between technical experts and political
decision-makers and difficulties in building adequate support coalitions.
These constraints can have possible solutions. One way in which redistribution can be
made more feasible in poor or middle-income countries (in Latin America and elsewhere)
would be to address the administrative and financial inefficiencies that typically
characterise most redistributive policies implemented in those countries. The reason why
redistributive schemes implemented in some developing countries have absorbed large
resources lies more in administrative and managerial inefficiencies than in the real costs of
the programmes. Mesa-Lago (1983) in his review of social security systems in Latin
America (one important form of redistribution) concludes that “the administrative costs of
social security funds in many Latin American countries are very high due to excess
personnel, inefficient operation, high salaries and privileged benefits granted to their own
employees (benefits usually superior to those of the insured that they serve), and the
luxury of their buildings and predilection for ultra-modern equipment (often under-
utilised)” (pp. 97). This situation applies also to the legal system of most Latin American
countries, the access to education and health care systems and the macro-management of
the various economies.
Important changes have recently taken place in the administration of tax systems in Latin
America (see  Tanzi, 2000). These have included the introduction of computers, the
establishment of special units for the control of large taxpayers and the widespread use of
withholding systems. However, a lot still remains to be done, particularly in terms of56
professionalising the management of tax administrations, putting barriers between tax
policy decisions and administrative decisions, reducing corrupt practices amongst
employees of the tax administration and increasing fines for non-compliant tax payers
(Tanzi, 2000).
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Better administration of tax systems, education and health systems and other institutions
has important impacts on the successful implementation of economic, social and political
redistributive policies. To provide an example, Dev (1996) has calculated for India that the
percentage in GDP of central and state governments’ expenditure on rural development
and social services was 6.9% in 1993-94, or 7.5% if food subsidy expenditure is included.
However, Guhan (1992) has calculated that if the whole of India was to implement a
social security systems similar to that of Tamil  Nadu (which has a relatively
comprehensive and administratively sound programme), the cost of the whole package
would represent 0.3% to 0.5% of India’s domestic product. Furthermore, countries like
China, Sri Lanka and Cuba have achieved impressive performances in terms of the
provision of basic needs, education and health care by using small percentages of their
domestic products (Drèze and Sen, 1991: 27). As Drèze and Sen argue, the successful
implementation of redistributive programmes in these economies “does not lie in the size
of financial allocations to particular public provisions. Their real success seems to be
based in creating the political, social and economic conditions under which ambitious
programmes of public support are undertaken with determination and effectiveness, and
can be oriented towards the deprived sections of the population” (pp. 28). This will,
naturally, impact on the levels of socio-political inequalities in those countries.
Furthermore, as we discussed in the previous section, not all taxes are distortive and not
all redistributive policies will affect private investment. Forms of dynamic redistribution
(Killick, 2002) or ‘redistribution with growth’ policies (Chenery et al., 1974) fit into this
category. These include the promotion of rural development, research and incentives to
encourage labour-intensive investments, infrastructural investment to reduce the
remoteness of many of the poorest, social policies to promote educational, health and
social capital, measures to eliminate biases against women as producers and consumers,
improved access to capital through financial sector reforms of micro-credit schemes,
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avoidance of macroeconomic crisis by sound microeconomic management (Killick, 2002).
Policies as these would guarantee that disadvantaged groups do not slip further on the
distributional scale due to their inability to respond to shocks caused by growth policies
and, because they have both a material and non-material dimension, reduce the extent of
economic, social and political inequalities in Latin America. The implementation of these
policies need thus not to destabilise the economy and can, in fact, contribute towards
social stability and lay the foundations for a more efficient and legitimate market
economy.
These policies should promote simultaneously two types of public investment: investment
in infrastructure and human capital (Gottschalk, 2003). This investment should be done in
a way that addresses both redistributive and economic growth concerns. At the
macroeconomic level, policies that should be adopted to support a pro-growth strategy
include moderate (rather than high) domestic interest rates and competitive exchange
rates. Other macroeconomic policies include the strengthening of financial and
supervision, capital controls (as in Chile) and counter-cyclical fiscal policy (in order to
stimulate domestic demand in periods of recession), including the adoption of stabilisation
funds such as Chile’s Cooper Compensation Fund and Colombia’s Oil Stabilisation Fund
(see Gottschalk, 2003). At the micro level, the provision of credit can play a key role in
enhancing the productive and earning capacity of the poor. In addition, they can encourage
an increase in savings by the poor by opening up to them new investment opportunities.
At the macro-management level, some Latin American countries have tried to curtail
previous weaknesses by promoting the “insulation of the technocrats” and concentrating
tasks in the hands of super-ministries. This has been done by selecting, training and
protecting central bankers, tax administrators, controllers, regulators and so forth from
political pressures and therefore reducing the scope for rent-seeking. These strategies have
had varied degrees of success as insulating technocrats and concentrating tasks in one
ministry may not be sufficient to guarantee the independence of their analyses and
decisions. In addition to these initiatives, Latin American governments could benefit from
a climate where several actors, such as independent think tanks, NGOs, academics,
independent central bankers, etc, are allowed to promote constructive dialogues with
government authorities (that should operate in a system of transparent democracy and
efficient coordination at all levels of governance), and therefore provide both reliable58
domestic advice and analyse independently the advice received from leading international
financial institutions. This would be aided by a better balance of power between executive,
legislative and provincial authorities and a more solid support of political coalitions.
In addition, poorer population groups need also to be more active in their pursue for more
extensive redistributive programmes. Of course, the political influence of poor groups is
itself negatively affected by the extent of political inequalities. Also, as argued in Acharya,
Schneider and Ugaz (2003), Latin American populations have often elected governments
known for their lack of support for redistribution. Given this ‘redistribution-averse’
environment in Latin America, political economy analyses indicate that policy
interventions will have to be well timed and targeted if they are to be successful.
Moreover, for these interventions to be successful, redistributive reforms require local
political support and the reduction of the political influence of elites and vested interests.
Voters might favour redistributive welfare spending if they believe that the rich could be
taxed effectively and rationally and that the tax system has been reformed and will no
longer produce perverse outcomes, whereby it benefits mostly the upper and middle
income classes. This may provide an incentive for a more active participation of the poor,
an essential factor in the reduction of inequalities in Latin America.
5.2. The role of the international community
International financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the
World Bank (WB) and the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) must also have a
role to play in the fight against economic, social and political inequalities in Latin
America.  Although it is recognised that the extent of economic, social and political
inequalities, discussed in section 3, constitute a serious constrain to the increase of
economic growth rates and the reduction of poverty in Latin America, very little has been
done by the international financial institutions to address directly those inequalities (see
Griffith-Jones and Kimmis, 2003).
As argued in Griffith-Jones and Kimmis (2003), the IMF has a central role in fostering
stability in the international financial system, as well as an institutional commitment to
poverty and inequality reduction.  As the principal provider of emergency liquidity
assistance during episodes of financial disturbance, the Fund plays thus a crucial role in59
both preventing and containing crises and, consequently, in reducing poverty and
improving equity, as highlighted by the recent crises in Mexico, Argentina and Brazil,
discussed in Griffith-Jones and  Kimmis (2003). In order to prevent and contain
international financial crises, the IMF must undertake several policy interventions,
suggested in Griffith-Jones and Kimmis (2003). These include the increase of the IMF
liquidity provision, the encouragement of mechanisms that facilitate orderly debt workouts
in order to decrease uncertainties in financial transactions and changes in the
conditionality that traditionally accompanies rescues packages in order to include higher
concerns for strong social safety nets in periods of crisis.
The IMF has a commitment to poverty reduction, but there have clearly been occasions
when the economic policy advice of the Fund, both in normal times and during crises, has
not been sensitive to the needs of poor people (Griffith-Jones and Kimmis, 2003).  Recent
efforts by the IMF to mainstream poverty and inequality concerns in its programmes in
low-income countries include the introduction of the PRGF and the PRSP processes. The
IMF should now extend those concepts across the board to all borrower countries.
As argued extensively in this paper, inequality is a very real problem in most Latin
American countries and, therefore, these concerns should be given prominence when the
Fund is putting together loan agreements for such countries. One proposal that deserves
further examination (see Griffith-Jones and Kimmis, 2003) is that a unit be set-up within
the Fund, something akin to the concept behind the Poverty and Inequality Unit at the
IADB, that could monitor the conditionality of the IMF with respect to the impact on
growth, employment, poverty and inequality. Such a unit could evaluate the impact of the
macro-economic policies that accompany both normal and emergency lending, and
provide advice to other departments on how to increase the impact of IMF lending and
advice on growth, poverty reduction and social equity.
Recent financial crises have also illustrated the need for stronger social policies to manage
the social repercussions of financial disturbances in developing countries. Examples of
such policies include unemployment insurance, income support, public works
programmes, price subsidies, nutrition programmes, social service fee waivers and micro-
finance programmes. It is difficult for governments to fund sufficiently large social
policies in times of crisis. For this reason, the international community should also be60
willing to provide assistance to developing countries with financing those policies in
periods of economic shocks. As strongly argued in Griffith-Jones and Kimmis (2003),
appropriate mechanisms should be designed, and resources allocated, for this purpose.
There is also scope for intervention by the World Bank (WB) and the Inter-American
Development Bank (IADB) in increasing lending and helping to catalyse capital flows to
Latin America in times of economic recession and, consequently, mitigating the
devastating social effects of financial crises in middle- and low-income economies. There
are a number of reasons why the WB and the IADB should continue – and even increase -
their role in lending, not only to poor, but also to middle-income countries. One of the
most important is the fact that presently net private flows to emerging markets are
approximately equal to zero. Lower growth, caused by declining private flows and
financial crises tend to hurt the poor most, through lost jobs and income and interrupted
education for children. This has the effect of further expanding inequalities in Latin
America. In face of this, long-term loans can finance investment in sectors where long-
term social returns are significantly higher than short-term private returns (such as
investments in health, education and infrastructure), and therefore where the private sector
does not wish to invest and where national governments may not have sufficient own
resources to fund.
Another important reason why the WB and the IADB should continue to lend (and even
increase) funds to middle-income countries is that this lending indirectly supports lending
to poorer countries. As discussed in Griffith-Jones and  Kimmis (2003), when middle-
income countries have crises and lose access to private flows, a negative trickle-down
takes place, with low-income countries automatically also having their access to private
flows sharply reduced. Consequently, avoiding a crisis in Brazil not only provides a stable
growing export market for poor countries like for example Bolivia, but it also increases
the prospect that countries like Bolivia will be able in the future to attract more private
flows. It also reduces significantly the likelihood of large capital flight from Bolivia
caused by a crisis in Brazil (Griffith-Jones and Kimmis, 2003).
Another key policy challenge for the WB, the IADB and the international community in
general identified in Griffith-Jones and Kimmis (2003), is how to help catalyse private
flows to Latin America in times economic crisis and how to provide additional counter-61
cyclical lending to compensate for sharp reversals of private flows. This is crucial because
without such measures, Latin America will continue to be the victim of boom-bust
patterns of capital flows, leading to very frequent and very costly crisis. These crises also
tend to worsen income distribution as they tend to hurt the poor most, through job losses,
decreases in income and the consequent decrease of households’ investment in the
education of children and health care. The main consequence of this is further increases in
economic, social and political inequalities in Latin America. A number of mechanisms can
be designed or improved to help catalyse private flows. These include guarantees and co-
funding and the encouragement of socially responsible investment, such as persuading
socially responsible investors to channel long-term flows to support pro-poor growth in
developing countries.
In order to support this increased role of the international financial institutions, the
international community must commit to increasing the resources available to those
institutions. It is also particularly important that the IADB, because of its closeness to, and
knowledge of, the region, has enough resources to play such a role.
One way in which international agencies can increase their role in the process of
inequality reduction in Latin America is to increase awareness of national policy-makers
for the problem of inequality and the need to resolve it. They can also participate in
building governments’ technical capacity to deal with the various issues, by providing
technical advice and support to individual governments in the design of the following
policies.
¤  Progressive tax systems that can be feasibly implemented in countries that experience
serious budget constraints.
¤  Policies that counteract the power of elites and their antagonism towards the
redistribution of income, assets and wealth and social and political rights. The
reduction of corruption amongst government employees and the curtailment of elite
lobbying will be of crucial importance.
¤  Policies aimed at reducing corruption in the administration of the various fiscal
systems and policies that promote larger efficiency in administrative tasks (more
qualified staff, wider use of computers, etc)62
¤  Social polices that increase the availability of more equal opportunities for all social
groups. Particular importance should be paid to the establishment of universal
secondary education, the increase of efficiency in the administration of public health
systems and better targeting systems in the distribution of social benefits and other
socially protective policies.
¤  Policies aimed at directly reducing discrimination and segregation in the labour
markets and in the access to social and judicial services, such as more transparent
procedures in job applications and the use of indigenous languages in the design of
legal documents.
¤  Creative financial arrangements that provide credit, and thus higher financial auto-
sufficiency, to poor people and small and medium enterprises. These enterprises have
an important role in the provision of local employment and should thus be further
encouraged through better access to credit and larger technical support.
Building governments’ capacity for dealing with the persistence of inequalities in Latin
America will not be sufficient without a more active participation of the civil society and a
change in social attitudes of both elites and the rest of the population. International
agencies should thus aim to increase awareness amongst these groups for the problem of
persistent inequalities and their consequences for the welfare of both elites and more
disadvantaged groups. This can be achieved through a more active collaboration between
World Bank, IMF and IADB staff and the following groups.
¤  Local small and medium enterprises. These are important sources of employment in
Latin America. Without a change in attitudes in local labour markets towards
discrimination, segregation and other bad job practices little will be achieved in terms
of reducing social inequalities in Latin America.
¤  Local governments that may need explicit advice in the adaptation of national policies
to specific community problems. These can range from a more efficient
implementation of food programmes to the strengthening of local legal procedures.
¤  Labour unions. These can play an active role in the protection of political
representation of member workers. Labour unions can have a powerful part in the
reduction of inequalities, as well-organised unions will be able to influence both local
job practices undertaken by public and private enterprises and lobby for the interests of
otherwise disadvantaged groups in the design of national policies (see Freeman and63
Medoff, 1984). In order to perform those tasks, labour unions need, however, to be
well-organised, benefit from efficient communication channels, have well-managed
and transparent accounts and be able to voice actively the demands of the workers they
represent. International institutions’ staff can have an important role in helping
committed labour unions to increase their technical efficiency and political
participation.
¤  Local communities and citizens’ associations. It is particularly important that local
communities are made aware of the devastating effects of inequality and the need to
increase their demand for better and more extensive redistribution of incomes and
social and political rights. As discussed in Acharya, Schneider and  Ugaz (2003),
population groups in several Latin American countries have implicitly supported and
tolerated, through the voting process, the implementation of regressive policies. The
political participation of local communities and the strengthening of their demands for
more redistributive policies is thus crucial for the reduction and avoidance of persistent
inequalities in Latin America. International institutions can influence this participation
through more active partaking of local staff in the dissemination of ideas and research
results and the discussion of relevant policies in local communities.64
6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This paper discussed and reviewed the importance of inequality for social and economic
development and argued for the need to reduce economic, social and political inequalities
in Latin America (and in other developing regions) through sound programmes of
redistribution of incomes, assets and wealth, as well as social and political rights.
Latin America has one of the highest levels of economic, social and political inequalities
in the world. These inequalities are predominantly dysfunctional, arising mostly from
political connections, inherited wealth and power and discriminatory acts against specific
population groups. Dysfunctional inequalities imply that particular regions, groups and
individuals are excluded from accessing public goods and services and from participating
in the political process of decision-making. This situation has, in turn, impacted negatively
on the prospects for increasing economic growth and reducing poverty in Latin American
countries and will have seriously negative effects on the achievement of the Millennium
Development Goals, as improving the living standards of poorer segments of the
population will be ineffective if these groups are prevented from accessing key economic,
social and political institutions and rights.
Due to adverse colonial legacies, bad governance, lack of political participation and
motivation and many other factors discussed in the paper, Latin America has exhibited a
particular pattern of development characterised by the persistence of high economic, social
and political inequalities in economies with incomes above the average in the developing
world. However, those levels of income lag significantly behind those of North America
and Europe. We argued in this paper that the extent of inequalities in the Latin America
region explains, to a large extent, why those economies did not perform better in recent
decades. The experience of Latin America shows clearly that increases in inequality must
be avoided, as high levels of persistent inequalities will have negative consequences on
important economic, social and political variables:
¤  High inequalities difficult the implementation of efficient macroeconomic
management policies.
¤  High inequalities restrain the demand capacity of poor and middle-income countries.
¤  High inequalities impede the establishment of pro-poor trade policies and emphasise
possible negative distributional impacts of international economic shocks.65
¤  High inequalities decrease the stock of human capital available in each economy as it
leads to the persistence of illiteracy and poor health amongst disadvantaged groups.
¤  High inequalities increase social discontent and, consequently, the propensity of
individuals and population groups for engaging in criminal activities, violence and
even civil wars.
¤  High inequalities hinder widespread political participation of deprived households and
poor local communities.
This constitutes an important lesson for poorer economies in Asia and Africa engaged or
about to engage in  the pursue of higher incomes and greater economic growth. As
discussed in section 3.4, although the level of economic and social inequalities in these
regions has generally been lower than in Latin America, a large percentage of individuals
in Asia and Africa does not have access to basic services. As incomes in those regions
rise, the probability of further economic, social and political inequalities is also likely to
rise. This is also a feasible scenario for formally centrally planned economies as they
finalise their transition towards full market economies. Table 9 in section 3.3.2 illustrated
that these economies have already experienced significant increases in income inequalities
during the later 1990s. Although education inequalities decreased during the same period,
it is not clear that this situation will be maintained if income inequalities continue to rise.
The Latin American experience highlights thus the importance of combining economic
growth policies with redistributive and socially protective policies in periods of economic
reforms. It also suggests that the rise of inequality likely to result from the development
process is not, under any circumstances desirable if that inequality is largely
dysfunctional. Although some level of inequality will result from the fact that market
economies will reward successful risk-taking strategies and skill acquisition (functional
inequalities), most types of inequality that took place during the development process of
Latin American countries were largely dysfunctional and there is no apparent reason to
expect that the situation in other economies en route towards middle-income development
will be different.
Successful development strategies can only be implemented when economic, social and
political inequalities are reduced or avoided altogether. The reduction and avoidance of
high inequalities requires, in turn, a combination of policies that simultaneously establish66
just distributional systems (of financial resources and social and political rights), guarantee
equal access to social and economic opportunities across all segments of the population
and eliminate all forms of discrimination and segregation. The implementation of such a
policy framework will depend on the coordination of efforts, not only from national
governments and the civil society, but also from the international community.67
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TECHNICAL APPENDIX - THE MEASUREMENT OF INEQUALITY
A. The axiomatic approach
The most important axioms currently used in the measurement of inequality include the
Pigou-Dalton transfer principle, the income scale independence, the principle of
population, the principle of anonymity and decomposability.
We begin with some notation.
29 Define a vector y of incomes, y1, y2….yi….yn, with yi˛￿
and  where n represents the number of units in the population (such as households,
families, individuals or earners for example). Let I(y) be an estimate of inequality using a
hypothetical inequality measure.
The Pigou-Dalton Transfer Principle (Dalton, 1920, Pigou, 1912). This axiom requires the
inequality measure to rise (or at least not fall) in response to a mean-preserving spread: an
income transfer from a poorer person to a richer person should register as a rise (or at least
not as a fall) in inequality and an income transfer from a richer to a poorer person should
register as a fall (or at least not as an increase) in inequality (see Atkinson, 1970, 1983,
Cowell, 1985, Sen, 1973). Consider the vector y’ which is a transformation of the vector y
obtained by a transfer  d from  yj  to  yi  , where  yi>yj  , and  yi+d >yj-d, then the transfer
principle is satisfied  iff I(y’)‡I(y). Most measures in the literature, including the
Generalized Entropy class, the Atkinson class and the Gini coefficient, satisfy this
principle, with the main exception of the logarithmic variance and the variance of
logarithms (see Cowell, 1995).
Income Scale Independence.  This requires the inequality measure to be invariant to
uniform proportional changes: if each individual’s income changes by the same proportion
(as happens say when changing currency unit) then inequality should not change. Hence
for any scalar l>0, I(y)=I(ly). Again most standard measures pass this test except the
variance since var(ly)= l
2
 var(y). A stronger version of this axiom may also be applied to
                                                
29 What follows draws on Litchfield (1999).76
uniform absolute changes in income and combinations of the form l1y+l21 (see Cowell,
1999).
Principle of Population  (Dalton, 1920). The population principle requires inequality
measures to be invariant to replications of the population: merging two identical
distributions should not alter inequality. For any scalar l>0, I(y)=I(y[l]), where y[l] is a
concatenation of the vector y, l times.
Anonymity.  This axiom – sometimes also referred to as s ymmetry - requires that the
inequality measure be independent of any characteristic of individuals other than their
income (or the welfare indicator whose distribution is being measured). Hence for any
permutation y’ of y, I(y)=I(y’).
Decomposability. This requires overall inequality to be related consistently to constituent
parts of the distribution, such as population sub-groups. For example, if inequality is seen
to rise amongst each sub-group of the population then we would expect inequality overall
to also increase. Some measures, such as the Generalised Entropy class of measures, are
easily decomposed and into intuitively appealingly components of within-group inequality
and between-group inequality: Itotal = Iwithin + Ibetween. Other measures, such as the Atkinson
set of inequality measures, can be decomposed but the two components of within- and
between-group inequality do not sum to total inequality. The Gini coefficient is only
decomposable if the partitions are non-overlapping, that is the sub-groups of the
population do not overlap in the vector of incomes.
Cowell (1995) shows that any measure I(y) that satisfies all of these axioms is a member
of the Generalized Entropy (GE) class of inequality measures.77
B. Measures of inequality
The most commonly used measures of income inequality fall into two categories (Sen,
1997): (1) positive measures, which make no explicit use of any concept of social welfare
and capture the extent of inequality by using statistical measures of relative income
variation (the range, the relative mean deviation, the variance, the coefficient of variation,
the standard deviation of logarithms, Theil’s entropy measure and the Gini coefficient);
and (2) normative measures based on the explicit formulation of a social welfare function
(Dalton’s measure and Atkinson index). Qualitative information obtained from
participatory investigations can, however, also be useful, particularly in the qualification
of non-income inequalities (see McKay, 2002).
The measurement of inequality implies the choice of a welfare variable, of a receiving unit
and a period of analysis. Each of these decisions involves both technical issues, relying on
what is practical or available, and conceptual issues, relating to how inequality is
conceived.
¤ The welfare variables most often used in economic studies are income and
consumption expenditure. Consumption expenditure data is usually of better quality
than income data in developing countries, particularly given the extent of self-
employment in family farms and firms, where incomes are difficult to disentangle from
profits (Deaton, 1997). Consumption expenditure may also provide a more accurate
picture of inequality in current living standards in poor economies, and it is argued is a
better indicator of “permanent” or long-run living standards.
¤ The most common unit of analysis is the household, with total household consumption
or income equivalised by the size and/or composition of the household. Survey data
does not allow the analysis of intra-household distributions (between men and women
and between children and adults). Some household surveys allow also the calculation of
inequality based on individual level data, such as earnings.
¤ The measurement of inequality implies a decision over which period inequality should
be measured, such as a reference week, month or year preceding the survey. New
household surveys and the use of panel data have, however, allowed the study of
inequality over longer periods of time. This has allowed researchers to analyse the
persistence of inequalities, their causes and their consequences (McCulloch and
Calandrino, 2001; Glewwe, Granolati and Zaman, 2002; Litchfield and Justino, 2002).78
The choice of an inequality measure is, however, more than just a technical choice as
different indices represent implicitly different value judgements. The most important
refers to the relative weight to be given to the different parts of the distribution (McKay,
2002).
While, for instance, GE(0) and GE(1) give greater weight to incomes in the lower part of
the distribution, the Gini coefficient attaches more weight to those households or
individuals in the middle of the distribution and the coefficient of variation and GE(2)
emphasise the top of the distribution. It is thus possible to observe only very small
changes in inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient, but very large changes in GE(2)
because of increases in gaps between income or consumption values in the upper tail. An
illustration of how different summary measures of inequality can suggest different stories
about changes in the distribution of income or consumption can be seen in table 2.
Comparing the paths of each measure over time it can be seen that GE(0) and GE(2) often
move in opposite directions, with GE(0) showing a decrease between 1987-90, 1990-92,
1992-94 while GE(2) rises during these years.
30 Between 1994 and 1996 each measure
reverses trend while between 1996 and 1998 both rise. Hence  GE(0) suggests that
inequality improved during the late 1980s and first half of the 1990s, when growth in
Chile was higher, yet GE(2) suggests the opposite.
CHILE 1987-2000: ALTERNATIVE MEASURES OF INEQUALITY
1987 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998
Gini 0.5468 0.5322 0.5362 0.5298 0.5409 0.5465
GE0 0.5266 0.4945 0.4891 0.4846 0.5139 0.5265
GE1 0.6053 0.5842 0.6151 0.5858 0.6058 0.6264
GE2 1.3007 1.3992 1.505 1.5634 1.4123 1.6172
Source: Litchfield (2001a). Note: Inequality estimates of income per equivalent adult.
The reason for the differing story can be understood when one remembers that the two
measures are more sensitive to incomes at different parts of the distribution – GE(0) puts
much greater weight on low incomes, GE(2) on high incomes. Inspection of incomes
across the deciles of the Chilean distribution revealed that incomes in the lower deciles
rose in real terms and also as a share of total income, suggesting a compression of incomes
                                                
30 Although changes in inequality appear small these changes have been shown to be statistically significant.79
in the lower tail, hence the fall in GE(0). At the other end of the distribution something
more subtle occurred. While the top 10% as a whole saw a rise in real values of incomes,
their share as a whole declined but the top 1%, i.e. the very rich, saw not only an increase
in real incomes but further increases in shares of incomes. Hence GE(2) rose.
Which measure should be believed, or relied upon for policy recommendations? There is
no straight answer to this: much depends on the policy objective and whether policy
makers are concerned about gaps between the very rich and the rest of society or gaps
between the middle and lower parts of the distribution. The table below summarises the
most common measures of inequality currently used in the literature.
MEASURES FORMULAS DEFINITION AND COMMENTS
POSITIVE MEASURES
Range E y y max min = - •  compares the extreme values of an income
distribution.
•  0£E£n. E=0 means that income is equally
divided; E=n if one person receives all the
income.

















•  M takes into account the entire distribution
and not only the extremes.
•  M=0 if there is perfect equality; M=2(1-1/n)
if all the income is held by one individual.
•  M is not sensitive to transfers from a poorer
person to a richer person as long as both lie














1 •  V is more sensitive to values of y further
away from the mean.
•  V depends on the mean income level and thus
one distribution can show greater relative
variation than another but still have a lower
variance if the mean income level is smaller
in the second distribution. So for example a
distribution of incomes expressed in two
alternative currencies (e.g. dollars and pesos)
will suggest that the distributions have
different levels of inequality.
Coefficient
of variation C V y =
1
2 /
_ •  Independent of mean income; concentrates on
the relative variation of incomes (unlike V).
•  A transfer from a richer person to a poorer
person will always reduce the value of C (i.e.,
C passes the Pigou-Dalton test).
•  However, a transfer from a person with $500
to a person with $400 or from a person with
$100100 to a person with $100000 causes C
to fall by exactly the same amount because C80



















2 •  H attaches greater importance to income
transfers at the lower end of the income
distribution.
•  Advantage  overV in the sense that it
eliminates arbitrariness of units and thus of
absolute levels.
•  H is not a concave measure of welfare at all
levels (as incomes get higher they suffer
increasingly larger contractions); it may not












= = ￿ ￿
1
2 1 1 1
_
( )
•  Measures average difference between all
possible pairs of incomes in the population
expressed as a proportion of total income.
•  0£G£1; G=0 indicates perfect equality and
G=1 means that one individual holds the
whole income.
•  NO: some formulae have the Gini expressed
in terms of differences from mean
•  G is sensitive to transfers from rich to poor at
every level.
•  G is closely related to the Lorenz curve of the
distribution: it is the ratio of the difference
between the line of absolute equality (the
diagonal) and the Lorenz curve.
31
•  G provides only a partial ordering of income
distribution (two identical Gini coefficients
can represent different shaped Lorenz curves
that intersect each other). Same could be true
of other inequality measures – simply
because they are summary measures
•  G attaches higher weight to people in the
middle of the distribution; thus it does not
fulfil the transfer sensitivity axiom.
•  G is a mean independent measure: if the
incomes of everyone were to double, the Gini






















•  the numerator represents the weighted area
between the 45º line and the Lorenz curve;
the denominator shows the weighted area
below the 45º line.
•  places more weight on transfers to persons at
the bottom end of the distribution (as opposed











•  entropy represents the expected information
content of a certain situation; the measure of
inequality is obtained by subtracting the
entropy of an income distribution from its
maximum value.
•  satisfies the Pigou-Dalton transfer condition
                                                
31 A Lorenz curve is essentially a line that joins in a graph the percentages of the population arranged from
the poorest to the richest (represented on the horizontal axis) and the percentage of income enjoyed by the



















•  a is a measure of the sensitivity to inequality
at different parts of the distribution. Lower
values of a place greater weight on inequality
in the lower tail (e.g. among the poor) while
higher values, particularly  a‡2, are more
sensitive to inequality in the upper tail (e.g.
among the rich).
•  All members of the GE(a ) class satisfy all of
the axioms listed above
•  GE(a ) class of measures are  ordinally
equivalent to the Atkinson class ( i.e
distributions are ranked in the same way)

















•  measures the ratio of actual social welfare to
the maximal social welfare (i.e., level of total
utility that would be obtained if incomes were
equally divided).
•  D is not invariant with respect to positive







































( ) e e •  measures the % of current income needed to
achieve our current level of welfare if all
incomes were equally distributed.
•  e is a measure of inequality: as e rises more
weight is attached to transfers at the lower
end of the distribution and less weight is
attach to transfers at the top.
•  A is a decomposable and subgroup consistent
index but less intuitive than the  GE(a)
decomposition.
Source: Cowell (1995).
Notes:  yi = income of person i;  y
_
= arithmetic mean income; n= total population;  L p x( ) = Lorenz curve;
q( ) p = weights (positive); si = share of income received by person i; U(.)= utility function.82













Argentina 19913 33.0 5136 25.5 - - -
19933 33.8 5796 17.6 - - -
19961 35.2 6052 18.4 4.6 2.3 0.48
19981 36.1 6716 17.9 4.5 2.3 0.49
Bolivia 19901 6.6 1658 65.6 32.8 20.2 0.55
19931 7.1 1752 63.4 30.7 18.3 0.53
19951 7.4 1831 63.6 29.7 17.4 0.53
19961 7.6 1862 62.1 35.2 24.8 0.59
19971 7.8 1896 62.3 34.5 24.2 0.59
19991 8.1 1987 61.4 36.9 27.4 0.60
Brazil 19802 - - - - - 0.58
19921 152.7 3882 48.3 23.8 15.0 0.57
19931 155.0 4013 49.7 24.5 15.5 0.60
19951 159.4 4307 44.7 21.3 12.9 0.59
19961 161.5 4369 41.6 19.7 12.0 0.59
19971 163.7 4449 41.3 19.5 11.9 0.59
19981 165.9 4413 41.9 19.1 11.5 0.59
19991 168.1 4412 41.3 18.7 11.1 0.59
Chile 19802 - - - - - 0.53
19901 13.1 4338 32.4 12.0 6.1 0.55
19921 13.5 4890 19.8 6.0 2.8 0.52
19941 14.0 5354 22.7 7.6 3.7 0.56
19961 14.4 6174 18.3 6.0 2.9 0.56
19981 14.8 6701 16.1 5.3 2.6 0.56
Colombia 19782 - - - - - 0.55
19911 35.7 3297 42.4 18.3 10.7 0.57
19931 37.1 3495 44.7 20.0 11.9 0.60
19951 38.6 3766 38.8 16.1 8.8 0.57
19971 40.0 3813 38.4 17.3 10.8 0.58
19981 40.8 3836 37.8 16.5 9.9 0.57
19991 41.5 3666 39.4 17.2 10.1 0.56
El Salvador 19772 - - - - - 0.48
19951 5.7 2130 58.6 26.4 14.5 0.51
19971 5.9 2158 61.3 28.4 15.4 0.52
19981 6.1 2192 64.0 33.5 21.3 0.56
19991 6.2 2235 64.0 33.4 21.3 0.55
Guatemala 19872 8.1 2104 73.2 42.2 29.1 40.58
19892 - - 64.3 36.6 25.4 40.60
19902 8.7 2127 - - - 40.60
19985 10.8 2457 33.8 11.8 - 0.5683
Honduras 19682 - - - - - 0.62
19891 4.7 1432 77.2 46.2 32.3 0.57
19902 4.9 1377 - - - 0.54
19912 5.0 1364 - - - 0.50
19921 5.2 1385 75.9 45.0 31.5 0.55
19932 5.3 1429 - - - 0.54
19961 5.8 1396 76.3 44.2 30.2 0.53
19971 6.0 1424 74.7 47.3 35.4 0.59
19981 6.2 - 74.9 46.7 34.9 0.59
19991 6.3 - 75.3 47.4 35.4 0.58
Mexico 19772 - - - - - 0.50
19891 81.7 5566 19.7 6.7 3.3 0.53
19921 86.4 6253 16.2 5.0 2.3 0.53
19941 89.6 6419 15.3 4.6 2.1 0.54
19961 92.7 6119 21.2 7.3 3.6 0.53
19981 95.8 6620 21.2 8.0 4.2 0.54
Nicaragua 19931 4.2 1186 70.7 41.2 28.9 0.57
19981 4.8 1485 72.7 40.9 28.1 0.60
Peru 19812 - - - - - 0.49
19911 22.0 2170 41.9 18.1 10.3 0.46
19941 23.2 2434 44.0 18.7 10.8 0.48
19971 24.4 2732 43.2 19.3 11.4 0.51
Sources: 1. Székely (2001). 2. Deininger and Squire (1996); high quality sample only. 3. World Bank, Global
Poverty Monitoring (http://www.worldbank.org/research/povmonitor/regional). 4. World Income Inequality
Indicators (WIID) (http://www.wider.unu.edu/wiid/ wiid.htm). 5. World Development Indicators 2001. 6.
Global Development Finance & World Development Indicators. 7. Penn World Tables 5.6.
Note: Székely (2001) results are based on a study of 76 household surveys that cover 17 Latin America
countries between the years of 1989 and 2000 and represent about 95% of the population in the region. This
study obeyed the following criteria: ( i) the household surveys are nationally representative (the only
exceptions are Argentina and Uruguay, where household surveys are restricted to urban areas but still include
more than 80% and 90% of each country’s population, respectively); (ii) the survey questionnaires include a
breakdown of income by source, with at least three separate questions on income that identify labor income,
profits, and capital rents separately (this assures lower measurement error in incomes); (iii) the recall period
for incomes is the same (the previous month) in each survey; (iv) the central purpose of all surveys used was
to collect information on the standard of living of the population. All estimates on poverty and inequality are
strictly comparable within each country. To accomplish comparability the author made sure that the
definition of income sources was the same within each country over time. Whenever there were changes in
the survey questionnaire, due, for instance, to a more detailed breakdown of income sources covered, the
minimum common denominator in the series for each individual country was identified and used as welfare
indicator for all years. Poverty measures are based on the use of household per capita income as welfare
indicator. To compute those estimators the author (i) uses a PPP $2-dollars-aday poverty line (1985 prices) as
criteria for separating the poor from the non-poor, and (ii) adjusts household per capita incomes to make
them equal to PPP-adjusted private consumption per capita (1985 prices) from the National Accounts.
32
                                                
32 The adjustment to private consumption is performed for three reasons: (i) since the adjustment transforms
the welfare indicator into the same units for all cases, cross-country comparability is improved; (ii) to
acknowledge that income tends to be underreported in household surveys and that the degree of under-
reporting may vary over time. By adjusting incomes to PPP private consumption the author imposes the
same limit on the degree of under-reporting across countries; (iii) consumption is normally regarded as a
better measure of welfare than income.84